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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 1st MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 20 August 1990, at 3 p.m.

Acting President: Mr. ADEYEMI (Nigeria)

President: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE THIRD SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (agenda item 1) AND SUBMISSION OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (agenda item 3) (NPT/CONF.IV/1)

The Acting PRESIDENT, in his capacity as Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee, declared open the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Conference had been convened in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, a proposal made during the Third Review Conference, and General Assembly resolution 43/82. The significant increase in the number of States Parties to the Treaty since the Third Review Conference, in 1985, was convincing evidence of the great importance attached to the need to ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Since 1985, actual reductions in nuclear weapons had been achieved for the first time as the result of a negotiated agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. The international community was now awaiting the finalization of an agreement between the two major nuclear-weapon Powers concerning the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. Yet there continued to be very serious concern that not enough had been done, or seemed likely to be done, to proceed towards the complete elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. With those issues in mind, and taking into account the review of the Treaty's future that was to take place in 1995, it was of the utmost importance for the Conference to reaffirm its strong commitment to the purposes of the Treaty's preamble and provisions.

Introducing the final report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.III/1), he said that the Committee had held three sessions, with 106 States Parties - or 36 more States Parties than the number that had taken part in the preparatory phase of the Third Review Conference - participating in the work of one or more of the sessions. The Preparatory Committee had adopted its final report on 2 May 1990.

ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT (agenda item 2)

The Acting PRESIDENT drew attention to the statement in paragraph 15 of the final report that the Preparatory Committee had unanimously decided to recommend Mr. de Rivero (Peru) as President of the Fourth Review Conference. He now wished to place the recommendation formally before the Conference for its approval.

Mr. de Rivero (Peru) was elected President of the Conference by acclamation.

The PRESIDENT said that he regarded the election of Peru to the presidency of the Conference as an acknowledgement of Latin America's pioneering action in support of the banning of nuclear weapons, as attested, in particular, by the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing the world's first nuclear-weapon-free zone. On behalf of his country and his region, he wished to thank all delegations and to pay tribute to his distinguished predecessors, who had so ably conducted the work of the earlier Review Conferences.

The ending of the cold war meant that the traditional view of international security based exclusively on ideological and military factors had to be replaced by a concept which encompassed the elimination of critical poverty throughout the world, the preservation of the environment and the protection of human rights, as well as disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation - in other words, a global and planetary view of security. The Conference was taking place within a political and strategic context entirely different from that of the three previous Review Conferences, which had been characterized by East-West confrontation. The Conference should not fail to take advantage of the opportunity thus offered and should consolidate and develop the non-proliferation régime as a political and legal institution essential to the restructuring of international relations now taking place.

A first agreement on the elimination of nuclear weapons had been concluded since the Third Review Conference of 1985, and negotiations for the elimination of other categories of weapons were under way. Those advances were an important first step towards fulfilment of the responsibilities which the NPT imposed on the nuclear-weapon States, and it was to be hoped that the process would continue apace. The non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, for their part, had succeeded in remaining on the sidelines of the nuclear weapons race, their rejection of the nuclear option bearing witness to a more profound

and more generous concept of national and international security involving a decision to channel resources towards eliminating poverty and preserving the environment rather than towards producing nuclear weapons.

The NPT had come into being as a product of the twentieth century, a century of wars and ideological struggle. It was for the participants in the Conference to convert the NPT into a citizen of the twenty-first century, which would surely be a century of peace.

MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. AKASHI (Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs) read out the following message to the Conference from the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

"The close of the 1980s has heralded an end to the cold war and to the escalating arms race between the major Powers that prevailed for 45 years after the Second World War.

The momentous changes in the world, particularly in East-West relationships, have diminished the threat of nuclear confrontation and made it possible to initiate and pursue a process of real reduction in nuclear weapons. The first agreement for actual reductions in nuclear weapons, the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of their Intermediate Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, was signed in 1987. The international community has also welcomed the agreement in June 1990 between the USSR and the United States on the framework of a START treaty on the reduction of strategic arms, and looks forward with keen anticipation to the completion of that agreement and to its full implementation.

The entire international community has long been convinced that a major nuclear war would be catastrophic for life on this planet. In the spirit of this conviction, the nuclear-weapon Powers have demonstrated, especially during the last decade, their increased determination to avoid a nuclear conflict. Now, negotiations to reduce nuclear arms have been supplemented by a reassessment of the military doctrines of the two major armed alliances. As a consequence, the arms race and military confrontation between them are giving way to disarmament agreements and confidence-building measures. There have also been important steps toward a widely anticipated agreement on conventional forces in Europe and intensive work on the completion of a chemical weapons convention.

While these positive developments in international relations must be sustained, there is a long road before us. Further substantive measures of nuclear disarmament remain a priority for the international community and must be realized.

In this wider process of nuclear arms limitation, the non-proliferation régime has played and will continue to play a critical role. The nuclear non-proliferation Treaty is central to this régime. Generally recognized as a landmark Treaty, it is the international arms limitation instrument most widely observed. No States have withdrawn from the non-proliferation Treaty and no party has been found to be violating its provisions.

It should be noted, however, that the Treaty imposes asymmetrical obligations on its two groups of States Parties, the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States. In such circumstances, it is of the utmost importance that all its parties should discharge their responsibilities in good faith and to the full. This commitment calls for, among other elements, clear assurances about the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and for energetic endeavours to end all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. At the same time, the right of States to develop nuclear technology for economic benefit must be both assured and reconciled with the overriding need to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.

Indeed, concern about nuclear weapons proliferation remains acute, particularly in the light of technological developments which could facilitate the development of a nuclear-weapon capability by additional States. Therefore the strict observance of the nuclear non-proliferation régime is of fundamental importance. Wider participation in the international non-proliferation régime is equally vital. This régime would also be strengthened if States Parties to the NPT that have not already done so concluded the requisite safeguard agreements with IAEA.

This Fourth Review Conference is the last one before the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty decide in 1995 'whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods'. Thus, this Conference will do much to determine the future and success of non-proliferation. Your review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty must, therefore, in particular provide a strong impetus and effective support to global and regional efforts to

implement fully the Treaty's objectives. I send you my best wishes for every success in your work, whose consequences can affect the whole world."

STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Mr. BLIX (Director-General, International Atomic Energy Agency) said that the Conference was taking place at a moment of dangerous confrontation in a strategic region of the world. Although the attention of Governments was necessarily focused on day-to-day developments in the situation, full consideration had to be given to the central topic before the Conference, that of ensuring that nuclear weapons were not acquired by further States, as well as to the closely linked topics of nuclear disarmament and the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology. The present conflict provided a stark illustration of the dangers inherent in arms races and armed conflict in the absence of mutual confidence and stability built up by accommodation, co-operation and verified arms control. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was already rendering vital service in many regions of the world towards creating such confidence and stability. Its principal shortcoming resided in its failure thus far to fulfil the aspirations towards universality and nuclear disarmament. Intense efforts would have to be made in both those respects before the crucial Review Conference of 1995.

The international scene had undergone tremendous change since the Third Review Conference. On the negative side, threats to the global environment had dramatically increased. Action was required in order to stabilize the world's population, channel additional resources towards development, reduce dependence on fossil fuels and expand the role of energy sources, including nuclear power, which did not threaten the environment. On the positive side, the risk of military confrontation between East and West was currently giving way to opportunities for expanded co-operation, including peaceful nuclear co-operation. Drastically reduced stockpiles of nuclear weapons and dramatically increased international co-operation towards the achievement of uniformly high levels of nuclear-power safety were now realistic aims.

Both the positive and the negative factors were of relevance in reviewing the NPT. Frustration due to the slow progress and modest results of disarmament negotiations should give way to the hope that the INF agreement, a START agreement and a CFE agreement would signal the dawn of a peaceful era in which large resources previously locked in arms production might be released for development and global environmental protection, a hope that should serve

to consolidate commitment to the Treaty. Several non-Party States had explained their failure to join the Treaty by referring to the different obligations it imposed upon nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, respectively. As disarmament negotiations began to bear fruit, those objections should be correspondingly reduced.

Another factor, potentially of equally great importance in terms of adherence to the NPT, was that nuclear weapons were beginning to look obsolescent. Although, as the current conflict in the Middle East showed, the emergence of a well-organized international community invariably using peaceful means to settle disputes was still a dream, the philosophy of mutually assured destruction seemed to be giving way to the realization that nuclear weapons offered no solution to security and that accommodation, resolution of regional conflicts and co-operation offered the only way of resolving differences, especially between great Powers. When that realization became universal, the commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament might do likewise. That line of reasoning attributed special persuasive value to the nuclear disarmament measures at present under way as well as those, such as a complete nuclear test ban and cessation of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons, which implied the abandonment of both the qualitative and the quantitative nuclear arms race. Positive results of active co-operation between East and West in defusing regional conflicts could be equally important for non-proliferation, since a peaceful climate lessened interest in nuclear weapons.

As to the role played under the Treaty by the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA safeguards had come a long way, both quantitatively and qualitatively, since their inception, when on-site inspection by an international organization had been a somewhat revolutionary measure causing a variety of misgivings. It would be wrong to say that all reservations had been dissipated; some still remained, and some new difficulties had been encountered. On the whole, however, the safeguards system had achieved maturity and strength. It was respected, recognized as impartial and accepted by all States, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon or Party or non-Party to the NPT. Moreover, the nuclear industry realized that nuclear trade in the world of today would be severely disrupted if the safeguards and the confidence provided by them were to disappear. The fear that safeguards would impede nuclear research and development had been laid to rest, although at times some concern was still voiced in a small number of States about the

cost and burden of safeguards and about the maintenance of commercial and industrial confidentiality. Throughout the system's years of operation, the Agency's Director-General had been able to report every year that he considered it reasonable to conclude that nuclear material under Agency safeguards had remained in peaceful nuclear activities or was otherwise adequately accounted for. That was encouraging but hardly surprising, since States had accepted and invited the safeguards in order to create confidence in their commitment to non-proliferation.

Referring to the background paper prepared by the IAEA on article III of the Treaty (NPT/CONF.IV/12), he said that safeguards agreements were in force with 85 out of the 136 non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. Negotiations for a safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been proceeding for some time; the latest round of talks had ended recently, unfortunately without a conclusion satisfactory to all concerned. It had none the less been agreed that contacts would continue and that further efforts would be made to find a satisfactory outcome leading to the conclusion of a safeguards agreement. Periodic reminders were sent to all NPT Parties with outstanding obligations to conclude agreements. The IAEA Secretariat was ready at all times to discuss agreement with those States.

Over the past 20 years the number of facilities under inspection had grown from 156 to over 900. While in 1970 there had been no enrichment plants and only one reprocessing plant under safeguards, there were five of each kind today. In 1970, there had been one small fuel-manufacturing plant under safeguards, but now there were 43. Extensive efforts had been made during the five-year period under review to establish effective safeguards arrangements at plutonium fuel manufacturing plants; one such plant had come into operation during the past five years in Japan.

A number of key improvements had been made with technical and financial support from several Member States and advice from the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation. New technical criteria had been developed which would serve as a basis for safeguards implementation and evaluation. Those criteria would initially be applied from the beginning of 1991 until 1995. Improvements in the quality of safeguards and safeguards implementation had resulted from modifications in the organization of the Safeguards Department. The upgrading of the Agency's offices in Toronto and Tokyo to Regional Offices had led to increased efficiency in the utilization of inspection resources and to improved effectiveness in the safeguards.

The question of optimum utilization of resources was of particular significance when, as was now the case, expanded safeguarding duties had to be reconciled with zero real growth budgets. Efforts on the part of the Agency had to be matched by maximum co-operation on the part of Member States. Objections were sometimes raised in individual countries to the use of some equipment or some new method. Better utilization of Agency resources could also be achieved if less effort had to be expended in connection with the designation and acceptance of inspectors. Since 1988, a simplified procedure had been used on a voluntary basis by 22 States, but ceilings on the number of inspectors and restrictions placed by some countries on whole categories of individuals still complicated the organization of inspection teams and travel arrangements. Cautious acceptance of on-site inspection had been understandable in the system's early days, but today, when inspection was seen as a normal element in agreements on disarmament, arms control and confidence-building measures, Governments might envisage adopting a more relaxed attitude towards impartial international inspection. Ideally, the acceptance of safeguards should be coupled with the acceptance of an inspector's passport issued for inspection trips without any additional visa requirement.

The need for budgetary restraints had prompted various ideas for savings. It had been suggested, for instance, that greater emphasis should be placed on the inspection of bulk-handling facilities and less on that of light-water reactors. The question whether some of the suggestions made could be acted upon without loss of safeguards credibility might perhaps be examined in the future, e.g. in the context of some major expansion of safeguards. At the present time, however, it would not be judicious to make any major modification which could be perceived as a reduction in the effectiveness of safeguards for the sake of economy. Rather, safeguards should be underpinned by increased resources, so as to sustain their reliability, resilience and responsiveness to new challenges. The system's continued success and viability were of vital importance to further reliance on international verification, and to impose severe budgetary restraints on the system would, in his view, be unwise.

Safeguards were a confidence-building measure and should therefore be of a quality which justified and inspired confidence. The annual Safeguards Implementation Report, recently updated and simplified in format and style so

as to make for greater transparence, was a frank evaluation which allowed Member Governments to assess the system's quality. The fact that the Report, which was an important factor in establishing confidence in the system, remained a restricted document was perhaps paradoxical, but misinterpretations - accidental or deliberate - could result from leaks when figures were taken out of context or quoted without adequate explanation.

All the declared nuclear-weapon States had made voluntary offers to accept safeguards. In the case of the United States and the United Kingdom, such offers concerned all nuclear installations designed for peaceful uses, while those of France, the Soviet Union and China related to identified installations in that sector. A certain body of opinion held that inspections under those offers were not very meaningful and that the function of safeguards was to promote confidence about the non-nuclear-weapon status of the country inviting inspection. Clearly, safeguards in nuclear-weapon States could not have that function. But in the unanimous view of the Third NPT Review Conference, the Agency should make wider use of the voluntary offers; the Third Conference had also stressed the principle that all peaceful nuclear installations should be under safeguards in all States. Regrettably, no expansion of safeguards in nuclear-weapon States had been possible under current budgetary constraints.

Inspection in nuclear-weapon States did not affect the important differences in obligations between nuclear-weapon States (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) under the NPT, but it none the less softened to some extent the dichotomy between the large number of closely inspected NNWS on the one hand and the small number of NWS, otherwise exempt from all inspection, on the other. States possessing nuclear weapons were not "rewarded" by having their nuclear installations exempt from the obligation of continuous accounting and periodic visits of inspectors. Furthermore, safeguards under the voluntary offers accustomed NWS to international on-site inspection. They also gave those and other States a useful external check on the accuracy of the national nuclear material accounting and control system. For the IAEA, inspection in NWS had provided inspectors with practical experience in safeguarding types of installations that had later come under safeguards in other countries.

The nuclear disarmament measures taken to date had not had any impact on the operation of safeguards in NWS. However, if enriched uranium or plutonium were to be moved from the military to the peaceful sector as a result of disarmament measures, assurances that that material stayed in the peaceful cycle could be provided by Agency safeguards. Perhaps the NWS could lead the way to a system of international plutonium storage, a system that was contemplated in the IAEA Statute and had already been discussed at length for surplus plutonium originating from the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

As far as possible, it would be desirable to use fissionable material recovered through nuclear disarmament measures as safeguarded fuel for generating electricity. The world would undoubtedly feel more at ease if that material was burnt up than if it was stored indefinitely, thus remaining theoretically available for the production of new weapons. It was to be hoped that in their future negotiations, the NWS would consider the potential use of safeguards for materials or installations that were moved into the peaceful nuclear sector either under current or expanded voluntary offers.

The fact that NPT-type safeguards currently predominated did not mean that other methods could not also be worked out, consistent with the Agency Statute, to respond to special requirements that might arise in a disarmament context. That also applied to nuclear-weapon-free zones. The main components of any safeguards régime would undoubtedly be the same, but special needs might call for tailor-made solutions, such as random inspection or permanently stationed inspectors.

Positive results had been recorded in the promotional activities undertaken by the IAEA in accordance with article IV of the NPT. Owing to the substantial increase in IAEA funds for technical assistance and co-operation, those activities had grown greatly during the years under review. The benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were being made available internationally. Whether in agriculture (for example, mutation breeding), industry (non-destructive testing) or medicine (radiation treatment of cancer), use of nuclear techniques was making steady advances. A current dramatic case that deserved special mention was the use of the sterile-insect technique to combat the New World screw-worm in Northern Africa, an infestation which could have tragic consequences if the large-scale project did not succeed.

Reliance on regional mechanisms for the dissemination of nuclear techniques was increasing. The Regional Co-operation Agreement in Asia, long recognized as being of very great practical value, not least in industry, had been followed by the Agreement on Regional Co-operation in Latin America and the recent African Regional Agreement. All would require effective governmental commitment, and additional resources were also vitally needed from the outside. In view of the steady growth in the use of nuclear techniques and radiation sources in developing countries, IAEA was expanding its co-operation there in the fields of safety and waste disposal. With few exceptions, the introduction of non-power nuclear techniques had been well received by the public and experts alike. However, that could change if safety and wastes were not handled responsibly. A few years previously, African States had sounded the alarm that hazardous wastes were being dumped on their territory. He was pleased to announce that no case had been found in which any nuclear waste had been dumped in Africa. The IAEA had drafted a code of practice with strict rules for the international transboundary movement of radioactive waste, but national and international regulatory restrictions were not enough. Positive action was also needed to establish suitable repositories for nuclear wastes arising in developing countries, for example from hospitals. Several accidents in recent years underlined the urgency of such action, to which the IAEA was giving top priority, inter alia through expert missions. Urgent attention was also being devoted to elaborating nuclear safety regulations and creating authorities responsible for supervising them. Many expert missions were also sent for that purpose.

The use of nuclear energy for generating electricity was potentially of tremendous importance for developing countries. The example of the Republic of Korea, where 50 per cent of the electricity was generated by nuclear power, showed how a rapidly developing country could benefit from reliance on nuclear power. By and large, however, such countries had been slow to make use of that alternative. Following a recommendation by the previous Review Conference, the IAEA had set up an expert working group to examine the problems facing those developing countries that wished to use nuclear power. As expected, the financing of large capital-intensive projects in countries with enormous investment needs had been identified as a major problem. However, other bottle-necks relating to the need for industrial infrastructure, a regulatory system and trained manpower had been found to be almost as important.

Over the past five years, a number of new factors had emerged with regard to the use of nuclear power in developing countries. First, the Chernobyl accident of 1986 had had a world-wide psychological impact. Second, although only a few advanced industrialized countries had decided not to use nuclear power, there had nevertheless been conspicuous stagnation in the global growth of nuclear power, partly because of a limited need for additional electricity in many industrialized countries, but also because of public reluctance in many of those countries to accept a further expansion of nuclear power. In such circumstances, it was not surprising that several developing countries, although foreseeing sharply increased needs for electricity, hesitated to introduce or expand nuclear power.

Another factor that had come sharply into focus since 1985 was the fear that even the current level of use of coal, oil and gas threatened to raise the temperature of the world's atmosphere. While the emissions of sulphur dioxide (SO_2) and nitrogen oxides (NO_x) from the burning of fossil fuels could, at a cost, be drastically reduced by technical means to avoid further destruction of forests and lakes, there was no economically viable way to avoid carbon dioxide (CO_2) emissions from the processes involved. Conservation and greater reliance on renewable resources of energy alone were insufficient to resolve the dilemma of generating more electricity while reducing CO_2 emissions into the atmosphere. Clearly the use of nuclear power was not a panacea, but the significant and technically reliable CO_2-free option could not be ignored.

For the developing countries, that perspective must be closely scrutinized. It was not a matter of indifference if China, already the world's largest coal consumer, doubled its use of coal by the year 2000 instead of stepping up its reliance on nuclear power; if India and Pakistan, currently not parties to the NPT, but advanced in nuclear techniques, made much greater use of those techniques to cover their energy needs instead of drawing more heavily upon fossil fuels; if rapidly developing countries, such as Indonesia and Thailand, or, for that matter, Egypt and a number of Latin American countries, including the non-NPT States of Argentina and Brazil, turned increasingly to fossil energy rather than to nuclear energy; and if new power plants in industrialized countries were fossil- rather than nuclear-fuelled. Interest in the nuclear power option would inevitably increase if, as seemed likely, the scientific evidence of the greenhouse effect grew. Political events giving rise to uncertainty about oil or gas

supplies would also increase awareness that nuclear power, with the small volumes of fuel that it required and that could be stored for long periods of operation, enhanced energy independence.

Renewed interest in nuclear power would focus on whether the new technology could be made so safe as to convince the public that accidents involving any significant releases of radioactivity could be virtually ruled out and that high-level waste was being isolated so safely that any significant releases could, for all intents and purposes, be excluded. Promising technological activity was under way in both those crucial areas. Already, much improved nuclear power plant designs existed for the most common reactor types. Efforts were being made to build smaller, less expensive and more simply designed power reactors that would be easier to operate and would rely more heavily on passive safety. Several designs of that nature were being developed, improving the chances of finding a moderate-sized and moderately priced CO_2-free source of electricity for developing countries. Universal adherence to the non-proliferation régime would facilitate world-wide dissemination of such new technology.

When looking forward to the crucial date of 1995, the Conference should bear in mind three interrelated factors: the need for universal adherence to the non-proliferation régime and for drastic global disarmament, including nuclear disarmament; the need for an increased transfer of nuclear technology, including simpler and more passively safe nuclear power plants, to promote development; and the need for better protection of the environment, including the importance of counteracting global warming and acid rain, and the relevance of the nuclear option in achieving that goal.

A dangerous confrontation was taking place in a strategic region of the world. Conflicts remained in other regions too. However, a new climate of co-operation improved chances for alleviating or resolving many difficult regional disputes and achieving very substantial global disarmament, and it also gave hope that greater and better use would be made of the international institutions, the United Nations and the specialized agencies, including the IAEA, which were indispensable instruments for tackling many global problems. In such a climate, it was not too much to hope that universal adherence to the non-proliferation régime might become a reality. Such adherence would set the stage for promoting the transfer of nuclear power technology on a universal basis. It would serve the cause of development, and all States and the global environment would benefit as well.

ADOPTION OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE (agenda item 4)

Ms. ESCALER (Philippines) congratulated the Chairman on his election and, speaking on behalf of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), said that, on 7 May 1990, ASEAN had addressed a letter to the Chairmen of the Preparatory Committee rejecting the reference to the "People's Republic of Kampuchea" in document NPT/CONF.IV/PC.III/18/Rev.1 and requesting rectification of the situation and circulation for information of copies of the ASEAN letter to the Depositaries and States Parties to the Treaty. ASEAN profoundly regretted that the instrument of accession in question had been accepted in the first place, because the "People's Republic of Kampuchea", which had been installed by foreign armed intervention, was not recognized as the legal representative of Cambodia. Such a decision was unacceptable.

ASEAN was actively involved in current efforts to allow the different Cambodian factions to come to an urgent agreement on the creation of a supreme national council as a vehicle for achieving national reconciliation and a comprehensive political solution to the Cambodian problem. The supreme national council must consist of representatives of all shades of political opinion which had support among the Cambodian people.

Mr. LUONG MINH (Viet Nam) said that his Government recognized the State of Cambodia, formerly the People's Republic of Kampuchea, as the sole legitimate representative of Cambodia, and considered that only the State of Cambodia could represent Cambodia in international relations, including international conferences and treaties. Viet Nam therefore recognized the State of Cambodia as the sole legal Cambodian party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The PRESIDENT said that, if there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to adopt the draft rules of procedure as contained in annex IV to document NPT/CONF.IV/1.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT said, with reference to rule 44 of the rules of procedure, that a number of requests had been received for observer status, namely from Argentina, Brazil, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, China, Cuba, France, Israel, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the United Republic of Tanzania. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference decided to accept the requests.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT said, with reference to rule 44 (4) of the rules of procedure, concerning specialized agencies and regional intergovernmental organizations, that the following organizations had requested observer status: the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Commission of the European Community. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference decided to grant the requests.

It was so decided.

ELECTION OF CHAIRMEN AND VICE-CHAIRMEN OF THE MAIN COMMITTEES, THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE AND THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (agenda item 5)

The PRESIDENT said that, at the third session of the Preparatory Committee, candidacies for the Chair of each of the three Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee had been approved unanimously, namely Main Committee I: Chairman: Mr. Adeyemi (Nigeria), Vice-Chairmen: Mr. Ditchev (Bulgaria) and Mr. Vaerno (Norway); Main Committee II: Chairman: Mr. Strulak (Poland), Vice-Chairmen: Mr. Villarroel (Philippines) and Mr. Meerburg (Netherlands); Main Committee III: Chairman: Mr. Yamada (Japan), Vice-Chairmen: representatives from the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and from Egypt; Drafting Committee: Chairman: Mr. Hyltenius (Sweden), Vice-Chairmen: representatives from Canada and from Hungary; Credentials Committee: Chairman: Mr. Groop (Finland), Vice-Chairman: Mr. Grozdanov (Bulgaria). If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference decided to adopt those nominations. The election of the other Vice-Chairman and the other members of the Credentials Committee would be reconsidered under agenda item 7. Consultations on that subject would continue, and he would inform the Conference at the appropriate time.

It was so decided.

ELECTION OF VICE-PRESIDENTS (agenda item 6)

The PRESIDENT said that, under rule 5 of the rules of procedure, the Conference must elect 26 Vice-Presidents. As no names had been proposed yet, he suggested waiting until a complete list, which could be expected the next day, was submitted.

CONFIRMATION OF THE NOMINATION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (agenda item 8)

The PRESIDENT said that, at the first session of the Preparatory Committee, it had been decided to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with the members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate an official to act on behalf of the Committee as provisional Secretary-General of the Review Conference. On 16 October 1989, the Secretary-General had nominated Mr. Arpád Prandler to that position, and the Preparatory Committee had taken note of the fact at its third session. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference decided to confirm the nomination.

It was so decided.

Mr. PRANDLER (Secretary-General of the Fourth Review Conference) thanked the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for confirming his nomination and assured the Conference that he would do everything he could to ensure the smooth operation of work. He was fully conscious of the significance of the Fourth Review Conference, which would affect the implementation of and commitment to the objectives and provisions of the Treaty in the years ahead.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA (agenda item 9)

The CHAIRMAN said that, if there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference approved the provisional agenda as contained in annex II to document NPT/CONF.IV/1, including the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee in annex III for the allocation of items to the three Main Committees.

It was so decided.

PROGRAMME OF WORK (agenda item 10)

The PRESIDENT briefly drew attention to matters of procedure concerning the programme of work.

ADOPTION OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEETING THE COSTS OF THE CONFERENCE (agenda item 11)

The PRESIDENT drew the attention of the Conference to the communication that the Secretary-General of the Conference had received from the Comptroller's Office in New York stating that, owing to the current financial situation of the Organization and in accordance with Financial Rule 114.3, the United Nations would be unable to incur the financial costs without the corresponding advance contributions from the participating States,

as already indicated in paragraph 18 of document NPT/CONF.IV/PC.III/16, of 28 March 1990. Total revised costs of the Conference and its preparation had been estimated at approximately $2.8 million. To date, a total of $1.1 million had been received. If no additional payments were made, the services for the Conference meetings would have to be adjusted accordingly, and he therefore made an urgent appeal to delegations for the corresponding payment to be made before 27 August. In view of the precarious financial situation, if additional financial contributions were not received he would be unable to prepare an appropriate working programme, and the duration of the Conference would have to be modified as a consequence.

The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.2
21 November 1990

: FRENCH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 2nd MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 21 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. ADEYEMI (Nigeria)

later: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

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General debate

Election of Vice-Presidents (continued)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12)

Mr. COLLINS (Ireland) said that his country had been associated with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) from the beginning of the debate in the General Assembly in 1958. Ireland had no nuclear weapons or installations for nuclear research, either civil or military, and could therefore speak out frankly on questions of nuclear proliferation. His country's support for the Treaty was unconditional.

Since the Third Review Conference in 1985, remarkable changes in the international climate had taken place. Improvements in East-West relations had eradicated the political and ideological bases for the cold war; the INF Treaty, an agreement to eliminate an entire class of missiles, had been signed and implemented; a strategic arms reduction treaty (START) should be signed shortly, a development which his country welcomed because its important political message would strengthen the NPT by demonstrating that important nuclear-weapon States were moving towards one of its most significant objectives. Progress had also been achieved in conventional disarmament; the successful conclusion of the negotiations in Vienna would contribute towards the attainment of general and complete disarmament.

The improvement in international relations might, however, mask a dangerous paradox. The spectacular developments in East-West relations seemed to suggest that the risk of global nuclear confrontation was diminishing. The negotiations which had taken place had resulted in reducing vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, but the realistic possibility of serious reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons held by the super-Powers was offset by the prospect of increases in the number of nuclear-weapon States. Horizontal proliferation was all too likely to have become a reality. The arguments which had made the negotiation of the Treaty a priority more than 20 years previously had lost none of their relevance. In first raising the issue before the General Assembly in 1958, the Irish Foreign Minister, Mr. Frank Aiken, had stressed the destructive potential of nuclear weapons and had expressed the belief that a single resort to those weapons could destroy the whole of mankind. Those concerns remained relevant even in the present considerably improved international situation.

True, the worst fears of the Treaty's authors had not been realized: the number of acknowledged nuclear-weapon States had not changed since the signature of the Treaty in July 1968. But the fact that certain States

continued actively to seek nuclear-weapons capability ran counter to the Treaty's objectives. Moreover, the activities of those "latent proliferators" made the balance achieved in the field of nuclear-weapons control a precarious one and placed at risk the safety of the present-day world and of future generations. The competition for military nuclear capability was a constant underlying challenge to non-proliferation efforts.

The Treaty, which represented the keystone of efforts to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons, had come of age. It was a complex agreement which provided a framework for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Fourth Review Conference must demonstrate realism and imagination to match the new role the Treaty was expected to play in the 1990s and beyond.

Prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be a major foreign policy objective of all States parties. During Ireland's presidency of the European Community, the Twelve had formulated a declaration on nuclear non-proliferation demonstrating their irreducible commitment to that objective. The declaration, issued at Dublin on 26 June 1990, was the first ever on the subject by the 12 Heads of State or Government of the European Community. It illustrated the high priority given to the issue by all the Community's member States and should encourage other States, both parties and non-parties to the NPT, to strengthen the non-proliferation régime.

With 141 States parties, the Treaty was the most widely-supported arms control agreement in history. However, some significant States still remained outside the Treaty. In order to be effective, the Treaty must be universal. A truly universal non-proliferation régime was the best guarantee of peace and stability throughout the world.

The Fourth Review Conference was a pivotal one. Since the question of prolongation of the Treaty was to be considered in 1995, an assessment that was both realistic and visionary was called for in 1990. The Conference faced a Herculean task. First, it should aim at strengthening the non-proliferation régime of which the NPT was the cornerstone. Secondly, it should encourage non-party States to accede to the Treaty. Thirdly, it should demand from all States parties full compliance with the terms of the Treaty. "Good faith" was a key term in that context: negotiations on nuclear disarmament must be pursued in good faith and non-nuclear-weapon States must, in good faith, comply with all their obligations under the Treaty.

The objectives being thus clearly defined, how could the Conference achieve them? The NPT represented a compromise among differing points of view, and any review must reflect the same spirit of compromise. There was little to be gained by evaluating how each separate article had been fulfilled; rather, the Conference should evaluate the Treaty as a whole in order to learn how to strengthen its implementation as a whole.

The Treaty drew a fundamental distinction between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Like all other non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, Ireland had forgone the right to develop a nuclear weapons capability and considered that the only acceptable level of nuclear weapons was zero. His Government did not believe that nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of a State. The nuclear-weapon States must negotiate reductions of nuclear weapons and eventually their complete elimination. The first step towards the zero option was to stop the development of nuclear weapons, which required an end to nuclear testing.

He therefore called on the nuclear Powers to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty. In 1980 and 1985, Ireland had advocated a moratorium on nuclear testing; today, he wished to make the same call with renewed vigour. His Government considered that a halt to tests and the conclusion of a treaty banning them would provide the clearest proof the nuclear-weapon States could offer of their commitment to complete nuclear disarmament and their determination to control the qualitative development of the arms race. In that connection, Ireland welcomed the agreements concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union on the ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, as well as the recent re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban within the Conference on Disarmament. Failure to agree on a comprehensive test ban treaty meant that one of the major hopes of non-nuclear-weapon States had not been met. In that regard, Ireland recognized the objectives of the forthcoming negotiations on the amendment of the Partial Test Ban Treaty and hoped that the Conference would lead to a commitment by all States, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

His Government took the view that a lack of credible or effective security assurances could only serve to undermine the Treaty. While recognizing that there could be no satisfactory solution to the problem, it felt that negative security assurances would be better than none at all. His

delegation looked forward to a debate on the question at the present Conference. It considered that the process of strengthening the non-proliferation régime must include the exploration of new security initiatives which would reduce the need to acquire nuclear weapons and would contribute towards confidence-building between States.

While the NPT was first and foremost aimed at the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it also provided for access for all parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His Government upheld the right of every State party to the Treaty to develop research and to produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Ireland had no plans to develop a nuclear-generating capacity, but since half of the world's nuclear reactors and a number of fuel-cycle facilities were located nearby, it was inescapably affected by nuclear safety issues.

According to the Brundtland report, nuclear power generation was justifiable only if there were solid solutions to the currently unsolved problems to which it gave rise. Since the previous Review Conference, the events at Chernobyl had shown the potential effects of a nuclear accident and demonstrated that radiation recognized no frontiers. Countries with nuclear power programmes should therefore operate those programmes in accordance with the highest possible safety standards and in full consideration of the risks posed to neighbouring States. An international nuclear inspection force to verify those standards would, in his view, be of benefit to both nuclear and non-nuclear States. The principles of international inspection which were already in operation in the context of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons could be applied to safety standards. His Government hoped that the Conference would consider that question, which was of the utmost importance.

His delegation welcomed the Conference on Nuclear Safety to be held by IAEA in 1991, which would contribute to the strengthening of international co-operation in the field of nuclear safety.

All co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was based on the safeguards implemented in an exemplary manner by IAEA. Those safeguards were in the direct interest of every party to the Treaty. His Government believed that the civil programme of the nuclear-weapon States should be safeguarded, particularly in the context of an eventual freeze on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. A marginal extension of the Agency's responsibilities would be sufficient for that purpose.

At a time when States were preparing to carry out significant nuclear arms reductions, the question arose of the disposal of the material recovered from nuclear-weapon destruction. His Government hoped that the Conference would explore the Agency's possible role in that area. It should also explore the possible answers to the problems of plutonium storage. Measures should be taken to ensure that any excess of special fissionable materials recovered or produced should be deposited with IAEA. Such an approach could contribute directly to the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime by preventing the stockpiling of materials which could be put to direct use in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.

International nuclear trade must be regulated. There was a need for a legal framework which allowed international trade to flourish while avoiding the risks of nuclear proliferation; such regulation of nuclear export controls would create a climate of confidence between trading partners. The "traditional" nuclear suppliers must promote restraint and encourage emerging nuclear suppliers to accept established nuclear-supply norms. Co-operation in the nuclear field must be conducted in accordance with the strictest non-proliferation standards. His delegation hoped that the Conference would develop the proposal on that question which appeared in the Final Document of the 1985 Review Conference.

His Government looked forward with interest to 1995 as an opportunity to reinforce the Treaty's provision and to renew its commitment to the Treaty for an indefinite period. The decision to be taken in 1995 was not whether to prolong the Treaty but for how long to prolong it. His delegation would welcome an indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty by consensus.

The time might not yet be ripe to foresee the nuclear agenda for the next century, but it was not too soon to begin preparations for achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. In the view of his Government, a renewed and strengthened Non-Proliferation Treaty was the right vehicle for reaching that objective.

Mr. LEHMAN (United States of America), said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was an ever more vital foundation for international stability in that it created conditions for reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons while also creating conditions for co-operation in the field of nuclear technology.

All members of the Preparatory Committee had noted the positive international climate which had emerged since the previous Review Conference and would agree that that general improvement, and particularly the progress achieved in arms control, augured well for the present Conference.

He then read out a statement by President Bush, */ which testified to the importance the United States attached to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the Review Conference.

The Treaty embodied the desire of States parties to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. His Government acknowledged, in particular, the contribution of the Republic of Ireland, whose proposal in the General Assembly had led to the negotiation of the Treaty in the 18-nation Disarmament Conference from 1965 to 1968. The negotiators had been confronted with many uncertainties, and the Treaty, when introduced in the General Assembly and opened for signature on 1 July 1968, had been received with doubts as well as hopes. Yet by the spring of 1970 over 40 States had deposited instruments of ratification and the Treaty had come into force. From the first, many States had considered the NPT a unique means of affirming their commitment to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons.

Those who questioned the Treaty's value should consider the state of the world today. Tension, confrontation and conflict continued to reign in many regions. The maintenance of international stability was crucial if diplomacy was to have any chance of success. In that context, the Treaty represented a legal barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons, provided mutual assurance of their absence, and reinforced international norms vital to world stability.

Since the end of the Second World War, Europe had been the focus of a prolonged, intense political and military confrontation resulting in what was perhaps the most dense concentration of military forces in history. Today, however, unprecedented changes were taking place, and political relationships within and among countries were being fundamentally restructured. All countries concerned needed assurance that the emerging new environment would not threaten their security. There again, the NPT served as a source of security and stability. His Government was therefore in favour of the

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*/ The full text of the statement will be issued separately.

indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995. In the meantime, it was the task of the present Conference to examine in depth the implementation of the Treaty since the previous Review Conference of 1985.

Commenting on the four main results achieved under the Treaty over the past five years, he welcomed, first, the accession of 10 new parties. Those accessions further strengthened the norms of nuclear non-proliferation and co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy under IAEA safeguards.

Secondly, he was pleased to note that during the past five years the Treaty had continued to facilitate access by parties to the many benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The transfer of appropriate technology was essential to the improvement of the quality of life in all countries, including developing ones; IAEA was to be commended for the central role it played in that field. Much nuclear co-operation also related to routine non-power applications in hospitals, farms, industrial enterprises and universities. The past five years had also seen the commissioning of 86 new nuclear power stations. During that period his Government had paid special attention to operational safety, and its assistance to States in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy reflected its commitment to preferential treatment of parties to the NPT.

Thirdly, the IAEA safeguards system was the centrepiece of the nuclear non-proliferation régime. Despite a zero-growth budget, the Agency had improved the scope and quality of its inspections. The United States had supported international efforts to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system by making voluntary contributions of over $30 million since 1985. Under a voluntary safeguards agreement which the United States had concluded with IAEA in 1980, the Agency could exercise the right to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in United States facilities, excluding only those immediately involved in national security. More than 230 public and private nuclear facilities were eligible for IAEA safeguards.

The United States continued to urge all nuclear suppliers to require the application of full-scope IAEA safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon States as a condition for significant new nuclear supply. Japan had adopted such a policy in 1989.

The United States continued firmly to support the work of the Exporters Committee, known as the Zangger Committee, set up within the framework of the Treaty, which ensured that nuclear exports were subject to IAEA safeguards.

The United States urged all States parties to the NPT to negotiate safeguards agreements in order to comply with the requirements of article III of the Treaty.

Fourthly, the United States had, over the previous five years, conducted intensive negotiations on a broad range of arms-control issues. The list of agreements and negotiations since the Third Review Conference made it clear that the United States was successfully discharging its responsibilities under article VI of the Treaty. Thus, in 1986, the United States had subscribed to the Final Document of the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe. In 1987, it had concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union on establishing nuclear-risk reduction centres and had signed the INF Treaty and an agreement on enhancing the norms established by the Biological Weapons Convention. In 1988, it had entered into an agreement with the Soviet Union on advance notification of ballistic-missile launches. In 1989, it had joined in the reaffirmation by the 140 participants in the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons of the need to uphold the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the use of chemical weapons and to achieve a universal ban on such weapons. In the same year, it had concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union on prevention of dangerous military activities, an agreement on implementing trial START verification and stability measures and an agreement on advance notification of major strategic exercises and an agreement with other NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in CSCE to open negotiations on conventional forces in Europe. In 1990, it had concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union on the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles, as well as new verification protocols related to the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. The United States was currently engaged in bilateral nuclear and space talks with the Soviet Union and in multilateral negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, confidence-building and security measures, and chemical weapons. It was also involved in a number of other discussions at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Many of those agreements and negotiations involved nuclear-weapon States, including the other NPT depositary States, namely, the United Kindom and the Soviet Union. Other

negotiations, such as the 1986 Stockholm Conference, the Conference on Disarmament or the talks on conventional forces in Europe, involved non-nuclear-weapon States as well, for article VI applied to all countries and not merely the nuclear-weapon States.

Stressing the importance of diplomacy in arms control matters, he said that negotiations could progress swiftly at times and slowly at others. Arms-control negotiations involved the most sensitive areas of national security. Progress must be made step by step, and it would be wrong to impose an arbitrary schedule for specific agreements. Only negotiations in good faith offered a chance of rapid progress.

Among notable achievements since the Review Conference of 1985 was the fact that the 23 States members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact were now making progress in their negotiations - covering the area from the Atlantic to the Urals - on conventional forces in Europe. At the Washington Summit, the United States and the Soviet Union had concluded a bilateral agreement to destroy the bulk of United States and Soviet chemical weapons by the year 2002. In December 1987, President Reagan and President Gorbachev had signed a historic agreement - the INF Treaty on the elimination of ground-launched intermediate-range nuclear delivery systems. The agreement, which had entered into force in 1988, had already resulted in the elimination of 2,257 Soviet and United States missiles and almost 800 Soviet and United States launchers, and in the introduction of an elaborate system of verification, including innovative forms of on-site inspection.

At their meeting in June 1990, President Bush and President Gorbachev had indicated that an agreement on strategic arms reduction might be signed by the end of the year. For the first time ever, both sides would carry out significant reductions - up to 50 per cent in certain categories - in the numbers of strategic offensive arms. Those reductions would be designed to make a first strike less plausible, providing greater stability and a lower risk of war. Moreover, the far-reaching reductions of the START Treaty would be accompanied by innovative provisions for effective verification and information exchange, thus increasing the confidence essential for a sound strategic relationship. When that goal was attained, the United States and the Soviet Union would continue their talks on nuclear and space weapons.

At the Washington Summit, the United States and the Soviet Union had concluded new verification protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, which should expedite those treaties' ratification. The United States had a step-by-step approach to further nuclear-testing limitations and to a comprehensive test ban as a long-term objective. So long as the United States had to rely upon nuclear weapons for purposes of deterrence, a sensible test programme would be necessary to maintain the reliability of those weapons.

The United States welcomed the establishment within the Conference on Disarmament of an Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

An issue of concern to the Review Conference was that of guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States that nuclear-weapon States would neither use such weapons nor threaten to use such weapons against them. In that connection, his Government wished to restate its policy, which had remained unchanged under three successive Administrations: "The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT or any comparable internationally-binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a State allied to a nuclear-weapon State or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack".

The United States was aware of the concern expressed by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT and would continue to participate in discussions on negative security assurances. At the same time, it was convinced that the existing negative security assurances provided adequate security.

A great deal had been accomplished in the past five years but much still remained to be done. The United States was optimistic but not complacent about the future. It was committed to take the necessary steps to ensure a stable and secure world. It also undertook to work towards universal accession to the NPT in view of the dangers in troubled regions of the world which were populated by nations which had not yet acceded to the NPT. The United States hoped that IAEA would receive sufficiently strong support to enable it to continue its effective role both in facilitating peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in the area of safeguards. Responsible export controls by nuclear supplier States were needed. It was also necessary to continue to move forward in arms control, especially in troubled regions where diplomacy was an essential means of resolving conflicts. The NPT was central to each of

those important and, in some cases, urgent tasks, and must continue to play a major role as a framework for peaceful nuclear co-operation and as a vital and irreplaceable instrument of international security.

Mr. de Rivero (Peru) took the Chair.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) read out a message from Mr. Gorbachev, President of the Soviet Union, and requested that the text of the message should be issued as an official document of the Conference. */

The Soviet Union regarded the NPT as the most important multilateral treaty on the basis of which the international régime for the horizontal limitation of nuclear weapons had taken shape and as a major factor for security and stability in a rapidly changing world. Although born during the period of the Cold War, it testified to the international community's political realism and sense of responsibility. The support given by the General Assembly to the Irish initiative in 1958 demonstrated the world community's recognition of the fact that an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States could only increase international tension, undermine the foundations of peace and place additional obstacles in the way of agreements on disarmament. Today, the NPT was one of the supporting structures of the securer world currently being built. The accession of each new State to the Treaty represented a major step towards mutual understanding and co-operation among States and one of the most reliable means of creating a new infrastructure of international relations in line with the civilized world's current level of maturity. The Soviet Union therefore welcomed the representatives of countries which had become fully-fledged parties to the Treaty since the Third Review Conference and, noting the interest shown in the Treaty by countries which had not yet acceded to it, in particular China and France, also welcomed their representatives who were participating in the Conference as observers. An increase in the number of observers was a notable development reflecting an objective trend towards the universalization of the non-proliferation régime.

The period following the Third Review Conference had coincided with revolutionary changes in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, and had been marked by a transition from an era of confrontation between

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*/ The full text of the message will be issued separately.

military blocs to one of co-operation, disarmament and the emergence of control mechanisms designed to ensure security. The world had entered upon a period in which the force of law, humanism and universal values were to enjoy priority over the rule of force. The new political thinking, focused as it was upon the democratization of international relations, had enabled the international community to show that it was capable of taking joint action instead of merely making declarations of intent.

The profound changes which had taken place in the interntional situation had had a direct effect on arms control and disarmament; it would be no exaggeration to say that a reliable peace process, accompanied by a gradual reduction of military potential, had already taken shape. That had been the object of the programme of stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction presented by the Soviet Union on 15 January 1986. The most important step towards the implementation of that programme had been achieved with the entry into force of the INF Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States, whose main political significance consisted in reversing the absurd logic of nuclear confrontation and destroying the dangerous stereotype according to which the nuclear arms build-up was unavoidable. For the first time, the USSR and the United States had agreed on the elimination of two classes of nuclear missiles and, according to a joint assessment made at the highest level, the implementation of the agreement was proceeding normally. The elimination of short-range missiles had been completed on both sides. As of 1 June 1990, the Soviet Union had, for its part, eliminated a total of more than 1,500 medium-range and shorter-range missiles, or 90 per cent of the original number. The experience of the INF Treaty in other areas of disarmament, and above all nuclear disarmament, especially with regard to verification mechanism, would be extremely valuable to the START agreement at present being negotiated, which was to mark the beginning of major reductions in strategic arsenals measured in hundreds of delivery vehicles and thousands of charges. As soon as possible after the conclusion of the Treaty, the two countries would hold consultations on future negotiations on nuclear and space weapons and on the strengthening of strategic stability.

There was now a real opportunity for radical reductions of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The Soviet Union had already withdrawn 500 nuclear charges stationed in the territory of its allies in 1989 and had refrained from modernizing its tactical nuclear missiles in 1989 or 1990.

At the CSCE in Copenhagen, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union had announced further reductions in the number of tactical nuclear missiles in Europe. Those measures were being taken by the Soviet Union unilaterally, without any prior condition. Reciprocal steps by NATO countries and their decision to hold negotiations on nuclear weapons in Europe should also be noted.

The Soviet Union favoured a ban on the production of weapons-grade fissionable materials, which should constitute a reliable barrier to both vertical and horizontal proliferation. It had ceased, on a unilateral basis, the production of highly-enriched uranium and had begun to implement a programme of gradual discontinuance of all its industrial reactors producing weapons-grade plutonium by the year 2000. It had also proposed the elaboration of a USSR-United States agreement, as well as a multilateral agreement, on verifiable cessation of production of all weapons-grade fissionable materials, compliance with which could be verified with the help of IAEA's experience. Lastly, the Soviet Union had proposed, at the United Nations, that agreement should be reached on the non-use for military purposes of nuclear material made available as a result of reductions in nuclear arsenals, together with a corresponding verification mechanism.

One of the Soviet Union's priority goals in the field of nuclear disarmament was the achievement of a nuclear test ban at the earliest possible date. From August 1985 to February 1987, the USSR had abided by its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, on the basis of reciprocity with the United States. Recent substantial reductions in its testing programme provided further proof of its serious intentions in that field and its strict compliance with its obligations under the NPT. Since 1989, it had not conducted any nuclear tests, noting with satisfaction that the United States, too, had curtailed its testing activity, at any rate judging by the first half of 1990. A solution to the problem of nuclear testing would largely depend on practical steps taken in that field by the United States.

The signing at the Washington Summit of protocols to the Threshold Treaties of 1974 and 1976 now made it possible to ratify those treaties and pave the way for setting further limits on nuclear tests with a view eventually to stopping them altogether. The Soviet Union favoured the continuance, without delay, of full-scale negotations in that field, in accordance with the agreement reached in 1987. However, the nuclear-testing

issue called for multilateral efforts in parallel with bilateral efforts, and the Soviet Union therefore consistently advocated that practical work on a test ban should be started, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In 1987, together with other States, it had submitted draft basic provisions of a treaty on the comprehensive and universal prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. One of the options in that respect would be to extend the 1963 Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water to cover underground testing. The forthcoming conference on that question should make a positive contribution to the search for a solution to the problem of a nuclear test ban.

Work on agreements aimed at reducing and eliminating nuclear arsenals should be accompanied by the strengthening of guarantees against the use of nuclear weapons, an objective for which the changes taking place in the world situation provided more favourable opportunities.

The Soviet Union reaffirmed its security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Its military doctrine was wholly defensive and it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons. It continued to be prepared to seek a mutually acceptable formula, which could then be included in an international legal instrument, setting forth the nuclear Powers' undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against States not possessing such weapons and not having them on their territory. The possibility of the nuclear Powers' unifying their unilateral guarantees in that field could also be studied.

His delegation supported, in principle, the Nigerian initiative on strengthening "negative" security guarantees.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world contributed towards enhanced regional and universal security and reduced the geographical area of nuclear preparations, thus strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation régime. The Soviet Union had actively supported the efforts made in that direction, particularly in connection with the creation of nuclear-free zones in Latin America and the South Pacific. De facto nuclear-free zones had also been declared in the Antarctic and in outer space, and some individual States had also opted for the denuclearization of their territory, a decision welcomed by the international community. The Soviet Union favoured the establishment of nuclear-free zones in subregions of Europe and in the Mediterranean and the Baltic, as well as in the Middle East,

Africa, South-East Asia, the Korean peninsula and other regions. It undertook to continue to comply with article VII of the NPT, in particular by providing appropriate guarantees to participants in future agreements on nuclear-free zones.

In the area of non-nuclear disarmament, too, there had been a number of positive developments since the Third Review Conference. A USSR-United States agreement on the non-production of chemical weapons and reductions by more than 80 per cent in stockpiles of such weapons had been signed, and a draft Convention on their complete prohibition was taking shape. An agreement on major reductions in conventional weapons and armed forces in Europe was expected before the end of the year.

The settlement and prevention of regional conflicts called for a comprehensive approach to non-proliferation, both horizontal and vertical, in order to create a barrier to the dangerous spread of all types of weapons. Disarmament processes must be globalized and international relations demilitarized, all countries - including developing ones - being actively involved in efforts to reduce military arsenals and build confidence; all categories of weapons must be covered by the negotiations.

The fact that the threat of nuclear terrorism had today become a reality made it urgently necessary to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, extend the number of parties to that Convention and enhance the effectiveness of its control mechanisms.

The control activities of IAEA were a major element in preserving and strengthening the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In accordance with article III of the Treaty, the Soviet Union provided nuclear materials and equipment to non-nuclear-weapon States only on condition that they applied the IAEA safeguards. Together with other supplier States, it participated in specifying and updating the list of nuclear materials and equipment whose export required application of those safeguards, and strictly complied with that list. It supported the proposals for the introduction by major nuclear-supplier States of a requirement whereby IAEA safeguards should be applied to all peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty importing nuclear items.

As stated in the USSR-United States declaration on non-proliferation adopted at the Washington Summit, all States parties to the NPT should strictly fulfil their undertakings under the Treaty concerning IAEA

safeguards. The effectiveness and authority of IAEA as a guarantor of the NPT should be given continued support. The Soviet Union, for its part, was ready to make a new contribution to that vital activity.

During the period between the Third and Fourth Review Conferences, the USSR had extended the list of peaceful nuclear installations open for IAEA inspection, in particular by including a fast neutron reactor. The voluntary placing of peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA control by nuclear-weapon States was acquiring special significance; as a gesture of goodwill, the Soviet Union was prepared to increase significantly the list of its nuclear installations placed under IAEA safeguards. All Soviet nuclear power stations and an additional number of research reactors had thus been included in the list which would be officially submitted to the IAEA General Conference in September 1990. That major initiative created an incentive for nuclear-weapon States to place all their peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards and to establish an accounting system with the Agency to cover all nuclear material used for such activities.

Secondly, it was important to continue improving the IAEA safeguards mechanism in order to ensure compliance by States with their obligations under the Treaty. To that end, the Soviet Union had paid over 7 million roubles to IAEA between 1986 and 1989 to support safeguards activities, and in particular to finance scientific research by IAEA. It intended to allocate 5 million roubles in national currency for the period 1991-1992 to finance the IAEA safeguards support programme.

Thirdly, the non-proliferation régime represented an unprecedented complex of international confidence-building measures, contributing towards greater international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The Soviet Union had learnt a lesson from the Chernobyl disaster, which had revealed mankind's vulnerability to the destructive force of the atom; it attached vital importance to everything relating to the safety of nuclear power plants. The most important area of international co-operation under IAEA auspices was ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy production. Four years after the event, the consequences of Chernobyl remained so grave that the Soviet Union could not be humanly expected to cope with them alone. Thanks were due to IAEA for the assistance it had provided. The Soviet Union, for its part, was resolved to participate in the international search for optimum methods of using the potential of nuclear energy.

It regarded as inalienable the right of all States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to participate on an equitable basis and without discrimination in international co-operation in that field. It had accordingly made a significant contribution to the development of such co-operation at both the bilateral and multilateral levels, in particular within the framework of IAEA. The Soviet Union's efforts were specifically concentrated on co-operation with East European countries with a view to ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy production and enhancing the reliability of electric power supply, while reducing the use of fossil fuels and protecting the environment.

The USSR was consistenty increasing its voluntary contributions to IAEA's Technical Assistance Fund and also made large deliveries of equipment, instruments and materials to the Agency. It had recently decided to allocate for the period from 1991-1994, in addition to its main contribution, an additional sum of 2 million roubles in national currency to the Technical Assistance Fund for the purpose of implementing assistance projects for developing States parties to the NPT. It supported the idea of creating a system of guaranteed nuclear supplies on the basis of principles currently being developed within the appropriate IAEA committee, taking into account the recommendations of the Third Review Conference, and also favoured the granting of a preferential régime to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty in obtaining equipment, material and information in the nuclear sphere.

Fourthly, with a view to maintaining a high level of international co-operation in the non-proliferation field, the USSR was prepared to continue bilateral and multilateral negotiations and consultations on the strengthening of the Treaty in order to make it universal. It valued its reputation as a reliable partner in co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and complied strictly with all its commitments in that area. Legislation on nuclear activity was at present being developed in the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Parliament was shortly to enact a comprehensive law on nuclear energy uses and nuclear safety, which would play an important role in the new structure of the State ruled by law now in the process of being established.

The political context of the Fourth Review Conference was very different from that of previous Conferences. The present stage of international development offered mankind a real prospect of guaranteed survival without the

threat of mutual annihilation. The opportunity to enter upon a peaceful period founded on international law and order was historic. But the creation of such a world called for the defence of the principles of civilized relations between States in all regions of the world and for a new quality of international security structures.

The NPT was an indispensable means of achieving a new world order and must be strengthened as a common heritage. Its potential, far from having been fully tapped, was increasing in the post-confrontation era. The Treaty was in the interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear States. Only a comprehensive agreement on the non-restoration of nuclear weapons following their complete and final elimination from the life of mankind could replace it in the future. For that reason the USSR called for the convening of a single conference in 1995 covering both the review of the operation of the NPT during the period 1990-1995 and the issue of its prolongation. The present Review Conference was called upon to confirm the value of the Treaty as an effective peacemaking mechanism of modern times.

His delegation, for its part, was willing to co-operate constructively with all parties to the Treaty with a view to finding solutions to the important tasks before the Conference.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland) said that the recent historic upheavals in his country had given rise to far-reaching political, economic and social changes in the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The new political situation that had resulted had revived the disarmament process and should make it possible to end the division of Europe once and for all by strengthening security and co-operation. That was also the prime objective of Polish foreign policy, in order to make Europe a genuine bastion of peace which would contribute to world prosperity.

Poland remained one of the unfailing supporters of the NPT, which it considered to be the crucial element of the non-proliferation régime and the cornerstone not only of its own national security but also of peace in Europe and throughout the world. Like all the countries that had participated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, it hoped that the NPT would continue to have a positive influence in the European context while remaining one of the pillars of world security.

Recent progress in the area of disarmament, the radical improvement in the international situation and the interest of the States parties to the NPT in the area of security and development should make it possible to strengthen

the Treaty further during the present Conference, following a constructive examination of all the problems raised by its implementation. The search for common solutions should result in meaningful recommendations on the methods by which the NPT would become genuinely universal and strengthen the common resolve of all countries to make it the pillar of world security and stability beyond 1995. Poland, for its part, saw the continued operation of the NPT as vital and would make every effort to contribute to the achievement of that objective.

The first steps taken in the area of nuclear disarmament with the implementation of the Treaty concluded between the United States and the USSR on intermediate-range nuclear forces, together with the progress made in the START talks, demonstrated the desire of the two super-Powers to meet their obligations under article VI of the NPT and gave reason to hope for substantial reductions in their strategic nuclear-weapons arsenals. But the world expected more from the implementation of that crucial article for the viability of the Treaty. Those signs of progress should be only a beginning, and considerable efforts were still needed in order to attain the desired tangible results. Certain urgent problems still needed to be resolved, in particular in the area of a ban on nuclear testing, testing which could only be conducive to the qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear arsenals in violation of the spirit of the NPT. Although the limited measures adopted by the United States and the USSR to reduce their testing were welcome, they still fell short of the long-standing expectation of the international community that nuclear testing should be brought to a complete halt, which was a fundamental measure aimed at ending the nuclear arms race. It was therefore to be hoped that with the improvement in their relationships, the two major nuclear Powers, followed by other countries, would soon take meaningful steps towards that goal. The Conference on Disarmament should be called upon to play a role in that undertaking, with additional constructive support from the conference currently being prepared on the review of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty.

The accession of 11 more States to the NPT since the previous Review Conference further enhanced the importance of the Treaty as the arms control agreement with the greatest number of adherents, and extended its operation to areas that were vital for international security. It was to be hoped that the

many States that had sent observers to the present Conference would subsequently decide to accede to the NPT. The presence of representatives of China and France, two nuclear Powers, was particularly important in that respect.

Other positive developments were the high-level political support given to the strengthening of the NPT non-proliferation régime and the IAEA safeguards system resulting from the Washington Summit between the United States and the USSR and that of the 12 European countries in Dublin.

Nevertheless, there were still causes for concern. Certain States, including some with nuclear capability, had not yet acceded to the non-proliferation régime. Today more than ever, the risk that they might gain possession of nuclear weapons must be eliminated, for the spread of such weapons to new States would destroy current prospects for nuclear disarmament, especially in view of the growing danger of the proliferation of missile-manufacturing technology. There was therefore an urgent need to strengthen the NPT among the States of the Middle East, southern Asia, southern Africa and the Americas. The current situation in some of those regions was dangerous for world stability and peace.

The Conference should provide an opportunity to persuade the major nuclear Powers, whose disagreements now seemed to be over, to combine their efforts in order to set up effective barriers against all risks of nuclear proliferation. As to the non-nuclear-weapon States, it was essential to give them security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The draft agreement submitted by Nigeria and the suggestions made by other delegations, notably that of Egypt, might serve as a basis for considering that question and making pertinent recommendations for further action - by the Conference on Disarmament, for example - in order to reach a long-awaited solution.

With its safeguards system, IAEA was continuing a very useful job which his country fully supported. In particular, it welcomed the fact that in its 1989 safeguards implementation report, the Agency had not detected any case of diversion of safeguarded nuclear material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or for any other military purpose. It was also a matter of satisfaction that of the States parties to the NPT that conducted nuclear activities, all but one had accepted full-scope safeguards. Poland made an urgent appeal to that State rapidly to conclude a long overdue safeguards agreement with IAEA.

One should not, however, be misled by encouraging statistics. While 95 per cent of all fissionable material and nuclear installations in the non-nuclear-weapon States were under IAEA safeguards, the remaining 5 per cent were not subject to IAEA inspection, notably in India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, Argentina and Brazil, States with developed nuclear installations and all non-parties to the Treaty. That could not but be a source of concern.

His Government greatly appreciated the efforts made by the Director-General of IAEA to explore with the Governments of the Middle Eastern States the possibilities of applying Agency safeguards to all nuclear installations in the region. That would contribute substantially not only to the consolidation of the non-proliferation régime, but also to the peaceful settlement of conflicts in that extremely vulnerable region.

In view of the importance of the IAEA safeguards system, it was essential for the entire international community, and in particular the States parties to the Treaty, to extend to the Agency their full support, both political and economic, given the growing complexity of the problems involved in implementing that system.

Compliance with the provisions of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty was of the greatest importance in safeguarding the principle of non-proliferation. For that reason, his Government expressed its concern at the increase in transfers of nuclear material, technologies and equipment without safeguards to States that were not parties to the NPT. It welcomed the appeals by the international community for strict controls on all such exports. The strict application of the safeguards would also facilitate international co-operation in the peaceful use of atomic energy.

With regard to article IV of the Treaty, his Government wished to pay a tribute to IAEA for its activities to promote co-operation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and noted with satisfaction that, during the past five years, the Agency had substantially increased its technical co-operation with the developing States parties to the Treaty. Of course, technical assistance and co-operation could be increased still further, especially within the framework of bilateral or regional agreements, particularly in Europe, and peaceful co-operation in the nuclear field could be stepped up for the benefit of all States parties to the Treaty, but there

was now no doubt that the Treaty had stood the test of time and that its implementation had made an inestimable contribution to the maintenance of international peace, security and stability.

Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) noted with satisfaction that the trend at the end of the twentieth century was for the continuation of the disarmament process begun in 1988, when the two super-Powers had agreed to eliminate their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and that there were encouraging prospects for the rapid signing of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning a 30-50 per cent reduction in their respective strategic arsenals. There was no doubt that the vigorous activity in that area was the result of international détente, but it also reflected the effectiveness of the non-proliferation Treaty, whose existence had in the past two decades played an essential role in maintaining international security and stability. In that respect, the Conference had played an essential role in the past by providing participants in the arms race with an opportunity to meet and hold discussions at a time when East-West tension had created a diplomatic vacuum and the risks of nuclear war had been growing considerably, forcing the non-nuclear-weapon States to remind the nuclear Powers of their obligations under the Treaty. Now, the spectacular improvement in relations between the two major nuclear Powers, the easing of tensions between the two military alliances and the structural changes in Eastern Europe bore witness to the arrival of a new era characterized by the replacement of confrontation by dialogue and by the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the settlement of numerous regional conflicts. Furthermore, the Fourth Conference was taking place at a critical stage, since it was the last one before the 1995 Conference, which would be called upon to decide whether the Treaty should be extended.

By promptly signing the Treaty on 1 July 1968, his country had demonstrated its conviction that that international instrument was likely to strengthen international security and promote multilateral co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It had also demonstrated its trust in the nuclear-weapon States which had, as a matter of urgency, pledged to begin negotiations on ending the arms race. More than 20 years later, his delegation noted that the implementation of the Treaty had on the whole been positive, but it shared the concern of the rest of the non-aligned countries as to the occasionally discriminatory exercise of the rights and obligations

of the States parties and would like to see a stronger commitment by the nuclear Powers to the international principle of non-proliferation and international co-operation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It also hoped that détente and the strengthening of confidence-building measures would lead all countries, and particularly the two nuclear Powers that were not yet members, to accede to the Treaty and make it genuinely universal.

He welcomed the fact that the three depositary Powers had on various occasions declared that they had met the obligations deriving from article I of the Treaty, the latest declaration having been the joint declaration made by the United States and the Soviet Union in June 1990, in which the two countries had reaffirmed their commitment to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such declarations, like those of the other States parties that were pledging to continue to respect the Treaty, were most encouraging.

The IAEA safeguards system formed the basis of the international principle of non-proliferation. In that connection, the information supplied by the Agency indicating that it had concluded safeguards agreements with 82 non-nuclear-weapon States was particularly encouraging, as was the fact that no case of diversion of nuclear material or misuse of nuclear installations for military purposes had been reported.

Although there were grounds for satisfaction with the responsible attitude of most States, the international community could not but be concerned when it learned that one of the States parties had allegedly refused to allow one of its installations to be covered by the IAEA safeguards system. That refusal would set a dangerous precedent, in particular for the non-nuclear-weapon States. China's decision voluntarily to allow some of its installations to be covered by the IAEA safeguards system constituted an important landmark for it meant that the Agency had now concluded agreements with all the nuclear-weapon States, including those that were not parties to the Treaty.

Article IV on international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was of crucial importance for the developing countries, in particular with regard to agriculture, industry, prospecting for mineral resources, energy, medicine and research. In that connection, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties should be entitled to preferential treatment, in conformity with the provisions of article V. Such co-operation among all States parties was all the more vital because the first Conference for the Promotion of

International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy had not fully met expectations. It was also important to ensure adequate protection of nuclear installations, not only against military attacks, but also against the consequences of the accidental or deliberate release of radioactive material, as had happened at Chernobyl. The negotiations undertaken in that area within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament should thus be continued and stepped up.

With regard to article VI, his delegation welcomed the progress made in that area by the two super-Powers and the continuation of the negotiations begun with a view to reducing their strategic arsenals by 30-50 per cent. Nevertheless, the new order of international security and peace would not be ushered in as long as the other three nuclear Powers remained outside the disarmament process. Co-operation in that area was all the more necessary because the two military alliances considered themselves no longer to be antagonists but partners in the setting-up of a new security system based on co-operation and dialogue, as proven by the progress made at the latest international conferences. In that connection, his delegation earnestly hoped that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, re-established with the Conference on Disarmament, would benefit from the United States-USSR bilateral negotiations.

Concerning article VII of the Treaty, it would be recalled that as far back as 1974 his country had associated itself with the other African countries in freely and unilaterally renouncing nuclear weapons in Africa; however, that continent was now facing the nuclear threat posed by South Africa. It was to be hoped that the far-reaching changes that had occurred in that country would lead to a change in the South African Government's position in that respect and would result in South Africa's acceding to the Treaty, submitting its nuclear installations to the IAEA safeguards system and pledging to respect the denuclearization of Africa. In that connection, his delegation regretted that the consensus in the United Nations on the denuclearization of the Middle East was being thwarted by Israeli opposition. The nuclear Powers that bore particular responsibility for maintaining international peace and security must urge Israel to accede to the Treaty, and the Conference should give due attention to Egypt's recent initiative aimed at making that part of the world an area free of any weapon

of mass destruction. The unreserved support for that proposal expressed by the countries of the region was a considerable advantage that should be used for the benefit of all peoples seeking peace and stability.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) read out a statement addressed to the Conference by Mr. Alberto Fujimori, the President of the Republic of Peru. */

ELECTION OF VICE-PRESIDENTS (agenda item 6) (continued)

The PRESIDENT announced the following candidatures for the posts of Vice-President: for the Group of Eastern European and other States: Bulgaria, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary, Romania and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; for the Group of Western European and other States: Canada, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Spain, United Kingdom and United States of America. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference approved those candidatures.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN announced that Mr. Jan Chandoga (Czech and Slovak Federal Republic) and Mrs. Tallawy (Egypt) were candidates for the vice-chairmanship of Main Committee III, and that Mr. Plamen Grozdanov (Bulgaria) and Mr. Kongsiri (Thailand) were candidates for the vice-chairmanship of the Credentials Committee. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference approved those candidatures.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT said that, in accordance with rule 44, paragraph 2, of the rules of procedure, Zimbabwe had requested the Secretary-General of the Conference to grant it observer status. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference agreed to that request.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

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*/ The full text of the statement will be issued separately.

PROVISIONAL

For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.3
29 August 1990

Original: ENGLISH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3RD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 21 August 1990, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

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Request from the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine for observer status

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee (continued)

General debate (continued)

Corrections to this record should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Official Records Editing Section, room E.4108, Palais des Nations, Geneva.

GE.90-66015/2318B

The meeting was called to order at 3.35 p.m.

REQUEST FROM THE PERMANENT OBSERVER MISSION OF PALESTINE FOR OBSERVER STATUS

The PRESIDENT said that a request had been received from the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to participate in the Conference as an observer and, in accordance with rule 44.2 (b) of the rules of procedure, he recommended that the request should be granted.

It was so decided.

ELECTION OF CHAIRMEN AND VICE-CHAIRMEN OF THE MAIN COMMITTEES, THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE AND THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (agenda item 5) (continued)

The PRESIDENT announced that the representative of Poland had been nominated to fill the remaining post of Vice-Chairman of the Credentials Committee. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference agreed to the nomination.

It was so decided.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

Mr. GROS ESPIELL (Uruguay), after congratulating the President on his election, said that the review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty must be placed in the general context of disarmament, its successes and failures, of efforts to restrict and regulate the use of other weapons of mass destruction or a particularly inhuman and destructive nature, of the right of every State to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and of the new criteria arising from the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. His country therefore believed that the Conference should analyse implementation of the NPT in recent years in the light of progress and frustrations in disarmament over the same period, bearing in mind the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy of every State, whether or not it was a party to the Treaty.

The Conference, which was taking place under the terms of article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, followed a period of five particularly rich years in which the acceleration of history had made for changes hardly envisaged in 1985. Progress in disarmament, agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, the new concept of security in Europe, the reunification of Germany, the current significance of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the end of the cold war were all aspects to be taken into account in considering what the Treaty was to represent for the years ahead.

There were now 142 parties to the Treaty, a figure which conveyed the impression that it was one of the few international instruments approaching universality. However, it was not sufficient simply to count numbers; the

nuclear capacity of the countries which were not parties to the Treaty was also an important element for consideration. A matter of concern to his country was that, among those non-nuclear-weapon States which had made the greatest progress in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, several were not party to the Treaty. Of the nuclear-weapon States, as defined in article IX, paragraph 3, only three were parties to the Treaty. At the same time, the considerable importance of the non-nuclear-weapon States must be borne in mind as it became evident that the technical capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons lay within the reach of a growing number of countries. Such a situation must be faced with frankness and open-mindedness. The claim that the Treaty was discriminatory and violated the principle of the equality of States before the law was not entirely devoid of significance; Uruguay did not share that view, yet recognized that it was held by States which deserved attention and respect. Of the Latin American countries, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba were not parties to the Treaty - an anomalous but not irrational situation, the causes and effects of which called for analysis. It had become essential to achieve a formulation by which full peaceful use of nuclear energy could be permitted, without interference or condition. Only thus could the NPT or any similar instrument become fully universal. For that reason, individual and collective dialogue between the States Parties to the Treaty and other States was essential.

As to articles I and II of the Treaty and the obligation of non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire such weapons, was everyone absolutely convinced that such was the case and that it could be asserted that no such State had made progress towards the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons? The present situation with respect to non-party States must also be considered. The Conference must examine matters as they really stood, with a genuine wish to find a solution. Articles IV and V should be examined in the context of new realities, so that the right recognized in article IV should not be discriminatory or subordinated to limitation requirements. The same could be said for article V.

Was the Treaty the only possible way to combat and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons? Actually, it was the most important, but not the sole or exclusive, means. Non-proliferation also had its basis in other treaties - those of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga - by which nuclear-weapon-free zones had been established. Such treaties did not have the discriminatory nature which some States found in the NPT, as they drew

no distinction between States Parties in relation to the prohibition on receiving, manufacturing, importing or using nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon-free zones and IAEA safeguards agreements as well as unilateral and bilateral declarations represented different approaches to the common and universal objective of combating all forms of nuclear-weapon proliferation. Uruguay, as a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, was making every effort to see that texts were adopted which would enable Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba also to become parties to that Treaty, so that the whole of Latin America might become a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

As to Security Council resolution 255 (1968), of 19 June 1968, and the "negative" guarantee by nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, there could be no doubt about the legitimacy of such a requirement on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States, yet no legally binding convention had yet been elaborated. It was for that reason that the proposal by Nigeria (NPT/CONF.IV/17) was so important. His country supported the proposal in principle, although the text was unnecessarily complicated in structure, and hoped that in final form it might be approved and open for signature, ratification and accession by nuclear-weapon States. It should further be recalled that the "negative" guarantee was also contained in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, to which China, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union were parties, and in Protocols II and III of the Treaty of Rarotonga, signed and ratified by China and the Soviet Union.

The international non-proliferation régime was necessarily closely connected with the safeguards agreements provided for in the NPT, in the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga and of the Statutes of the IAEA. The latter organization had reported that on 31 December 1987 safeguards agreements were in force with nine non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to any of the three major treaties and which were engaged in significant nuclear activities, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba. It was important to note that fact as it showed that there was a will to accept international inspections even outside the context of the three treaties. It might thus be appropriate to examine, through a genuine process of self-criticism, the substantive reason why some States were not parties to any of the three treaties.

Lastly, Uruguay confirmed its readiness to co-operate realistically in an integral, just and non-discriminatory manner, in activities to combat the

proliferation of nuclear weapons. It wished to see such action truly integrated into a complete head-on struggle against all forms of armament, particularly weapons of mass destruction and chemical, bacteriological, radiological and space weapons - action which respected the peaceful use of nuclear energy and guaranteed the use of modern technologies and took into account the situations of those States which, in good faith and without warlike intent, had not yet signed the NPT. Only thus, within the broader framework of international law to combat nuclear proliferation could the Treaty continue in an age so different from that in which it had come into being in 1970.

Mr. VAERNO (Norway) said that the Treaty was the most important multilateral agreement on disarament and arms limitations concluded so far and its successful operation was of vital importance to the world community. The Conference had an important task before it in reviewing the operation of the Treaty over the past five years and in suggesting new measures to strengthen the non-proliferation régime. The constructive atmosphere which had prevailed during the preparatory process leading up to the Conference augured well for a successful outcome stemming from a full and fair assessment of the operation of the Treaty leading to a balanced, substantive and forward-looking final document.

The current review exercise was taking place in a period of revolutionary change and upheaval; East-West relations had undergone a fundamental improvement and as a result of the peaceful revolution in Eastern Europe and the departure from previous policies, Europe was moving from an era of containment to an era of co-operation. Physical and political barriers had been dismantled, the painful post-War division of Europe was being overcome, as the imminent unification of Germany demonstrated, through the CSCE process and through existing institutions such as NATO, the European Communities and the Council of Europe; and the nations of Europe were endeavouring to develop co-operative structures to enhance mutual confidence and reduce the risk of misunderstanding.

In no other field had the new era in East-West relations made more impact than in arms control. Major progress - the INF Treaty and the Stockholm Document - had already been made and more significant achievements were within reach. The prospects of an early START Treaty, providing for sizeable reductions in strategic nuclear weapons were promising and it was to be hoped that bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union

would be successfully concluded in the near future. In Vienna, the end-game in the negotiations on conventional forces was about to begin and his country was confident that, given the necessary political will, the major issues that remained outstanding could be sorted out in time for the first CFE treaty to be signed at the CSCE summit in November 1990. Together with a meaningful package on confidence- and security-building measures, such a CFE agreement could dramatically improve security and stability in Europe by eliminating the capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations and would help consolidate the recent political changes and serve as a barrier against any attempt to re-establish the previous status quo. Such an agreement would also pave the way for significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals in Europe and new negotiations could be started on the reduction of Soviet and United States short-range nuclear forces. In addition, at the July summit in London, the members of NATO's integrated military structure had made it clear that they intended, in response to reciprocal action on the part of the Soviet Union, to eliminate all the Alliance's nuclear artillery shells in Europe.

However, events in the Gulf were casting a shadow over the positive developments in East-West relations and in the arms control field. The situation was aggravated by the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction and the crisis could be solved only by full adherence to the recent unanimous Security Council resolutions.

The issues before the Conference were global in nature. Concerted action by all countries was required to solve the problems facing them. In that context he reiterated his country's unequivocal support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its willingness to participate in all constructive efforts towards a strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. To illustrate its priorities, Norway, together with the other Nordic countries had submitted a memorandum (NPT/CONF.IV/18) listing a set of objectives and measures which they considered important. They had stated universal adherence to the Treaty and full compliance with its obligations as the best way of achieving the Treaty's primary goals. It was therefore a most positive development that 141 countries were now parties to it.

The increasing number of adherents to the Treaty did not give grounds for complacency. As everyone was aware, some members of the world community, both nuclear and non-nuclear, had not yet become Parties. Some of them were on record as pursuing a policy in accordance with the basic principles of the

Treaty. Others, however, continued to state their reservations about the Treaty and the non-proliferation régime. That some of the non-Party States were present as observers at the Conference was an encouraging sign.

In considering compliance with articles I, II and III, the Conference would be reminded that the danger of proliferation was a very real one. The development of nuclear technology and the spread of technological knowledge and of nuclear installations to different parts of the world had meant that a number of non-nuclear-weapon States had acquired the scientific and technological basis for developing nuclear-weapon programmes. It could thus be assumed that the number of States with a nuclear potential was greater than was openly acknowledged. Furthermore, a number of countries had, or could acquire, a reasonably effective nuclear delivery capability. The spread of such capabilities was of great concern to the world at large. Those issues should be adequately addressed at the present review.

Some non-Party States with substantial nuclear programmes seemed to feel that they were best served by keeping the nuclear option open. Such an approach was likely to create uncertainty and to exercise a negative influence on regional stability. A stabilizing and confidence-building effect would be achieved if the countries concerned at least concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA for all their nuclear facilities. But the situation also underlined the importance of continued efforts in support of universal adherence to the Treaty. His Government was convinced that no country's interest was served by pursuing a policy in favour of a nuclear-weapon capability.

The objectives of ending the nuclear arms race and implementing effective measures for nuclear disarmament were a major and integral part of the Treaty. It was gratifying to note that considerable progress had taken place during the period under review and that the prospects for further advances were good. In that connection, he referred in particular to the agreement on basic provisions of the START Treaty achieved at the United States-Soviet summit in June 1990. He also noted with satisfaction that the two parties were to begin further talks on strategic nuclear forces specifically to achieve a more stable strategic balance after the Treaty was completed. The signing of verification protocols for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty opened the way for the ratification of those instruments and thus represented a step towards a comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing.

A total and permanent ban on all nuclear explosions remained an important objective. His country was convinced that the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty was an essential pre-condition for effectively halting the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons. In that regard, it was a positive development that the Conference on Disarmament had in July 1990 finally reached agreement on a mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. In accordance with that mandate, the Committee had, as a first step, initiated substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues, including structure and scope as well as verification and compliance. The question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban had to be seen in conjunction with efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. In that connection, it was worth noting that the members of NATO's integrated military structure had made it clear that, upon the total withdrawal of Soviet forces stationed in Europe and the implementation of a CFE agreement, they were prepared to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. In its London declaration the Alliance had made it clear that, in the new Europe, nuclear forces would only be weapons of last resort.

Norway was also very concerned about the environmental and health risks associated with underground nuclear testing, especially in vulnerable environments, and regarded those risks as an additional reason for discontinuing all test explosions. An effective verification system was of the utmost importance in any international arms control and disarmament agreement. In a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, international co-operation in the exchange and analysis of seismic data would be one of the main prerequisites for adequate monitoring of compliance. His country had consistently supported the efforts of the Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament to develop a global seismological system to assist in the verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and considered that the outstanding problems of verification could be solved.

The Amendment Conference of the Partial Test Ban Treaty was to take place at the beginning of 1991. Norway would be participating in it and thought that one of the main objectives should be to give impetus to work being done on the test ban issue within the Conference on Disarmament.

The subject of negative security assurances had been on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament for many years, and successive resolutions had also been adopted by the General Assembly. There was a patent need for an agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon

States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, little progress had been made on that issue in the past few years. Negative security assurances involved questions relating to the fundamental security of States. Given the wide range of security concerns and the variety of means available for dealing with them, it was difficult to arrive at a decision on a single common formula. Nigeria's proposal (NPT/CONF.IV/17) for an agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States should, in his delegation's view, be discussed in the light of the development of the military doctrines of nuclear-weapon States.

An effective international non-proliferation régime was indispensable for expanded international co-operation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. IAEA safeguards played a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. However, the international safeguards régime needed to be further strengthened in order to develop measures to ensure a predictable long-term supply of nuclear material, equipment and technology. Norway was concerned that a number of countries, including some with substantial nuclear programmes, had not yet concluded the required safeguards agreements with the IAEA. That fact, together with disturbing reports of activities in some non-nuclear-weapon States, underlined the paramount importance of giving the IAEA the opportunity to verify the compliance of every non-nuclear-weapon State Party with its obligation not to divert peaceful nuclear material and equipment to nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. That could be done only when all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties had concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA, as stipulated by the Treaty. His Government regarded as a positive development the fact that all nuclear-weapon States accepted limited voluntary IAEA safeguards on some of their civil nuclear facilities. Adequate safeguards were indeed one of the significant challenges facing the present non-proliferation régime. Effective strengthening of the régime implied that emerging nuclear suppliers and nuclear threshold countries had to be included in existing or new international export arrangements.

His Government continued to attach great importance to the obligations deriving from the Treaty and the non-proliferation régime as it existed at present, and considered that the application of full-scope safeguards by the recipient country should be a minimum condition for allowing export. Norway practised such control and was actively engaged in international co-operation

towards making it effective. Lastly, he hoped that the present review exercise would lay firm foundations for an indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995.

Mr. VITALONE (Italy) said that the Conference was opening at a time when the international community, faced with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, was threatened by events of unprecedented gravity and danger. The intolerable annexation of a free, sovereign State by another member of the United Nations, which as such was required to respect the sovereignty and independence of others, Iraq's brutal military aggression against Kuwait, were unacceptable to the international community, which had categorically condemned the invasion. International legality should now be restored by ensuring full observance of United Nations resolutions and putting an immediate end to a situation which represented a flagrant violation of human rights.

Against such a background, the overwhelming importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was self-evident. The Treaty's status as the principal multilateral instrument in the field of arms control was reflected by the fact that over 140 States had acceded to it in the desire not only to prevent a recurrence of the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but also to contain the possibility of generalized conflict. Recent developments in the Soviet Union and in the countries of Eastern Europe had radically transformed the international scene, so that the Second World War and the ensuing cold war could be said to have come definitively to an end. In that connection he referred in particular to the London declaration of the NATO countries, as well as to the conclusion of the INF agreement and the agreements concerning the reduction by one-half of the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two Great Powers. He also stressed the importance of the adoption of verification protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, as well as the ongoing Vienna negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe and of the forthcoming Paris summit of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The Italian Government, in its capacity as current President of the European Community, was actively engaged in all those endeavours.

While it represented an enormous improvement over the cold war era, the present situation was not, however, without its attendant dangers. In the first place, the process of East-West détente was accompanied by a potentially explosive growth of national ambitions. Such a development, especially in areas traditionally beset by regional conflicts, could be a threat to

international peace and regional stability. In that connection, he wished again to refer to the situation in the Gulf, on which Italy unconditionally shared the position of the other EEC countries. A second danger inherent in the international situation lay in the contrasting economic and demographic circumstances of different parts of the world. A third danger, dramatically evidenced by the problem of international drug trafficking, was related to the economic and social fields. The Non-Proliferation Treaty should be seen against that background. His Government took the view that the efficacy of the Treaty should be safeguarded and improved in the interests of all - even in the presence of intolerable events such as those now taking place - through meticulous observance of its provisions and strict fulfilment of its objectives. Italy would make every effort to ensure that the Conference succeeded in laying the foundations for the decisive Conference of 1995 with a view to further consolidating the non-proliferation régime.

Participation in the IAEA safeguards system should represent an indispensable addition to adherence to the Treaty, particularly in the case of countries which, like the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, had signed the Treaty and possessed nuclear installations of some importance. At the same time, everything should be done to optimize that system of international control, which had already produced highly positive results and constituted a most useful example for other arms control agreements.

A number of States had acceded to the Treaty since the Third Review Conference. It was to be hoped that others would follow, so that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons might become a truly universal objective. It was important that doubts in connection with nuclear programmes pursued by certain States should be dispelled and that agreements facilitating the effective performance of the IAEA's inspection functions should be generalized.

Gradual growth of co-operation and assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy undoubtedly formed an essential element of the system established under the non-proliferation régime. Since the previous Conference, prospects of peaceful utilization of nuclear energy had been profoundly shaken by the Chernobyl accident which had tragically brought out the crucial importance of nuclear safety arrangements. Italy was actively involved in international efforts in that field and was convinced that safety considerations should occupy a position of priority in all new technological research. In particular, it was determined to contribute towards the IAEA

programme of verification of the safety of nuclear facilities in Eastern Europe, to support all initiatives aimed at improving safety standards at nuclear power stations, and to encourage the dissemination of research on a new generation of fail-safe reactors.

Direct co-operation on ensuring maximum safety of nuclear facilities must begin by applying the types of technical assistance provided for in article IV. The IAEA agreements on the general procedures and mechanisms for meeting emergency situations must also be enhanced. Inspection missions undertaken at nuclear facilities by the Agency at the request of the States concerned must be stepped up. Consideration must be given to reconverting for peaceful uses the nuclear material used in the military sector. That meant not only reducing the overall quantity of fissionable material but also verifying whether such material had actually been reconverted, something which would thus prevent it from being diverted. One proposal, first put forward by Italy in 1967, would be to harness the fissionable material recovered from nuclear warheads scrapped by the super-Powers for peaceful uses in the least developed countries.

Italy had made a tangible contribution to the IAEA's technical assistance activities. A number of projects in agriculture and medicine had been of particular importance in improving the quality of life. Furthermore, Italy made regular financial contributions, amounting to $US 68 million in the past five years, to the International Centre for Theoretical Physics, in Trieste, run jointly by the IAEA and UNESCO. With regard to international security and disarmament, an area in which the Treaty had its main impact, progress could still be made on a comprehensive test ban, negative assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and the creation of denuclearized zones. Multilateral negotiations must also be pursued to achieve a ban on chemical weapons.

The best way to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons was to maintain and strengthen an efficient international nuclear non-proliferation régime, which other countries must be encouraged to join. The past five years showed that the Non-Proliferation Treaty had produced positive results.

Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan) said that the Conference should serve as an occasion to reaffirm the key role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in maintaining peace and security. With more than 140 States Parties, the NPT was the most widely accepted agreement in the history of international arms control. Japan was pleased that observers had been sent by two nuclear-weapon

States not parties to the NPT régime, France and China and it was also encouraged by the smooth implementation of the INF Treaty by the United States and the Soviet Union and by the progress made in recent START negotiations towards reaching mutually acceptable solutions on major issues.

Nuclear energy currently generated 17 per cent of the world's electricity, a share that was on the increase, for its value as an energy source which did not produce carbon dioxide had attracted increased attention. Clearly, the NPT was functioning well as a basic framework for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His delegation had doubts, however, about the NPT régime's success in preventing the development and possession of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon States. It was also a matter of major concern for many countries that some States Parties still failed to fulfil their obligations under the NPT to conclude safeguard agreements with the IAEA for their nuclear facilities.

Japan had been undertaking various diplomatic steps to ensure the universality of the NPT. Appeals had been made to a number of non-Parties to join the Treaty. It was to be hoped that China and France would accede to the Treaty as soon as possible. Until such time, Japan appealed to those two countries to continue to abide by the spirit of the NPT. It was gratifying that, at the Houston Economic Summit in July 1990, a joint statement on proliferation had been issued and all participants, including France, had supported a broad-ranging agreement on nuclear non-proliferation. Japan also called upon those non-nuclear-weapon States with major nuclear facilities in operation or under construction that had not yet acceded to the Treaty to join the NPT régime as soon as possible. In the meantime, they must take concrete action to accept full-scope safeguards, thereby dispelling any suspicion regarding their motivations for not joining the NPT régime.

As to the export of nuclear-related equipment and materials to non-nuclear-weapon States, Japan had strict regulations for issuing export licences only when the recipient country adhered to the NPT and accepted full-scope safeguards under the IAEA. It was to be hoped that other exporting countries would implement equally strict regulations.

Although nuclear-weapon States were not required to accept IAEA safeguards under the NPT régime, they should be on an equal footing with non-nuclear-weapon States with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Japan therefore welcomed the conclusion in 1989 of the safeguards agreement

between China and the IAEA, following the example of other nuclear-weapon States. Clearly, IAEA safeguards should be applied to nuclear facilities in nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike.

Non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT must accept the full-scope safeguards applied to all nuclear activities on their territory. Since that comprehensive safeguards system lay at the core of the non-proliferation régime, the need for further technical and institutional improvement to ensure efficient implementation could not be over-emphasized. In view of the increase in both number and size of nuclear facilities throughout the world, and bearing in mind the financial constraints on the IAEA, efforts must be pursued to improve the cost-effectiveness of the safeguards procedures. The severe financial constraints placed upon a number of States Parties made it wise to begin streamlining the inspection activities by developing simplified safeguard methods. The established procedures for safeguards and inspections should be reviewed, with a view to enhancing the work of the system. The IAEA safeguards system had functioned smoothly for many years and could serve as a valuable example in developing a verification system for future multilateral disarmament agreements.

Japan was determined to continue to extend co-operation to the developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, yet at the same time work towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In that context, it greatly valued the important role played by the IAEA. His country placed emphasis on multilateral co-operation through the IAEA, and had increased its contribution to the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund in 1990 to $5,120,000, or 11.27 per cent of the total, a figure that represented an increase of 193 per cent compared with that of five years earlier. Using its advanced technology in the nuclear field, Japan had been playing a central role in financial and technological assistance to developing countries in Asia and the Pacific through the implementation of regional co-operation programmes. Despite increasingly severe budgetary constraints, it would continue to contribute as much as possible towards expanding multilateral co-operation through the IAEA. Japan intended to enhance its bilateral co-operation with developing countries through technical and research co-operation activities. Such co-operation would be carried out only with those countries that had acceded to the NPT and had accepted the full-scope safeguards agreement.

At the Third Review Conference, his delegation had stressed the need for appropriate nuclear disarmament efforts by nuclear-weapon States, and Japan greatly appreciated the efforts made by those countries in the past five years. In particular, it hoped that the recent signing of the verification protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty would pave the way for ratification of the two test-ban treaties at an early date. Japan was encouraged by the inclusion in the two protocols of provisions for verification through the hydrodynamic method, the seismological method and on-site inspections, and it hoped that the combined use of such techniques would help resolve the complex technical problems related to nuclear test-ban verification. His delegation urged the United States and the Soviet Union to draw upon the experience gained through the implementation of the two treaties to prepare the ground for the next stage of negotiations in the test-ban field as soon as possible.

Further nuclear disarmament could be achieved only if efforts were also made towards conventional arms control, for example, by removing the imbalance in conventional forces. His Government therefore welcomed the endeavours by the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries to reach an agreement on the reduction on conventional forces in Europe.

The Conference on Disarmament was an eminently suitable forum for considering the issue of a nuclear test ban. The Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee, currently chaired by Japan, had a number of important items before it, such as the political and security implications of the continuance or discontinuance of nuclear tests, the modalities of a test ban to take into account such implications and technical problems relating to verification. In his opinion, the Conference on Disarmament had taken a significant step forward by initiating substantive work on specific and interrelated test ban issues, including structure and scope as well as verification and compliance. A step-by-step approach was the most realistic way to achieve a comprehensive test ban. His delegation hoped that the Ad Hoc Committee would be re-established at the beginning of the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

Obviously, some countries might still have reservations about strengthening the NPT régime, but a reluctance to accede to the Treaty and a reluctance to abide by its obligations by some States Parties because of the discriminatory nature of the NPT régime or because other countries failed to fulfil their obligations would delay the realization of the NPT's goal of

eliminating nuclear weapons and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT should be viewed as part of a dynamic process aimed at an ultimate objective rather than as a static collection of obligatory norms. Failure of the NPT régime would have serious consequences for international peace and security. Japan supported the NPT régime because of its unique role, its intrinsic discriminatory character notwithstanding. It was to be hoped that the international community also shared that view and would continue its efforts to strengthen the régime. Japan was convinced that the Conference would be a useful occasion for enhancing the requisite co-operation.

Mr. MacKAY (New Zealand) said it was particularly fitting that the Conference should be presided over by a citizen of a country which was a party both to the NPT and to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The task of the Conference involved a backward look over the five years since 1985 to see how the NPT had been fulfilled and also, implicitly, a look forward at what more could be done. It was also an occasion to look again at the bargain struck between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States in 1968 and see how the bargain was being kept.

The past five years had seen many positive developments: reduced tension in Europe, progress made in some areas of arms control and the fact that the NPT had gained greater support than ever before. The Treaty and its non-proliferation goal, had also been enhanced in other ways. At the time of the 1985 Review Conference, the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone had just been established by the Treaty of Rarotonga. The Treaty was now in force and there were 11 States Parties. It established a nuclear-free zone which bordered on that created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and that established by the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. Thus, a large part of the southern hemisphere had declared its determination to be free of nuclear weapons.

The Treaty of Rarotonga was intended to complement the NPT and specifically referred to article VII of the NPT in the preamble. It required the application of IAEA safeguards on all source or fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities by the Parties. Like the Treaty of Tlatelolco, it also provided for a system of special - or challenge - inspections in the event of a suspected breach. The Treaty had protocols open to signature by the five nuclear-weapon States and China and the Soviet Union had signed them. The United States and the United Kingdom had affirmed that their actions were compatible with the protocols and his Government hoped that they would be able to transform those statements into a formal commitment by

signing the protocols. It was a matter of deep concern for New Zealand that one nuclear-weapon State, France, continued to test nucear weapons in the South Pacific. His delegation welcomed the presence of both France and China as observers at the Conference and hoped that, in the light of recent developments in arms control, France would decide to act in keeping with the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga, in accordance with the wishes of the peoples of the South Pacific.

New Zealand, faithful to its undertakings under the Treaty of Rarotonga and the NPT, would never acquire nuclear weapons and such weapons had no part to play in its defence policies. In 1987, those principles were firmly embodied in legislation which established New Zealand as a nuclear-free zone. The law prohibited the introduction of nuclear weapons to New Zealand and the provisions of the NPT were explicitly incorporated into the country's legislation.

In the five years since the previous Review Conference, there had been unprecedented progress in nuclear disarmament as between the major Powers. The conclusion of the INF treaty had eliminated a whole category of weapons, agreement on significant reductions in strategic nuclear weapons was close and there were grounds for optimism with regard to short-range nuclear forces. Welcome developments in the conventional area had also had an impact upon the nuclear arms race. The chemical weapons agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the progress towards an agreement on conventional forces in Europe showed a new willingness to achieve concrete and major disarmament measures.

The level of nuclear weapons, however, continued to be unacceptable and would remain so once all the agreements in prospect were completed. One arms control measure - specifically referred to in the preamble to the NPT - was a comprehensive nuclear weapons test ban, and little progress had been made in that regard. A comprehensive test ban was an essential and urgent step towards ending horizontal and vertical proliferation. That view had received overwhelming endorsement in the United Nations. As pointed out by the New Zealand Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control: "Any nuclear test, by any nation, for whatever expressed purpose, is deeply offensive to New Zealand. Each new weapons system begets another. Each new test weakens the moral strength of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and increases the chances that another country will blast its way into the nuclear weapons club". The recent commencement of discussions on a nuclear test ban at the Conference on

Disarmament was to be welcomed but it did not involve the commencement of negotiations. Even with that limited mandate, one of the nuclear-weapon States - which was not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty - would not participate. His delegation believed it essential for the Conference on Disarmament to remain seized of the issue of nuclear testing.

Securing universal adherence to, and ensuring full compliance with, the NPT constituted vital goals for all countries, since all of them benefited from the Treaty and not only the States Parties. The Treaty would, however, be immeasurably strengthened if every country became a party. In particular, membership by all nuclear-weapon States would lend even greater authority to the Treaty and to the norm of non-proliferation.

With or without universal adherence, however, non-proliferation could be effective only if States Parties complied scrupulously with their obligations. In particular, it was essential that mandatory safeguard agreements should be entered into in accordance with the clear requirements of the NPT. Instances of non-compliance were of the greatest concern to New Zealand, all the more so when the country concerned had significant nuclear activities. Only through the effective application of safeguards could the international community have confidence that the most fundamental of the obligations under the NPT was being met.

New Zealand fully supported efforts to strengthen the safeguards régime still further. It would like to see all nuclear-weapon States extend their voluntary offers to include all their peaceful nuclear facilities. It also strongly supported full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty.

It was important for all States Parties to have confidence that their security was enhanced by the NPT, something that was reflected in the search for a legally binding common formula on negative security assurances. His delegation shared the hope that the positive changes in the international scene would bring that possibility much closer.

Within the past five years the world had been given a stark - and appallingly tragic - reminder of the consequences of the atom unleashed. At the sametime it had been reminded of the value of the Treaty. In the next five years, efforts should be made to strengthen commitment to nuclear non-proliferation in all its forms. For New Zealand, that objective remained vital.

Mr. OGADA (Kenya) said that the NPT continued to be cherished by many States 20 years after its entry into force, as was eloquently reflected

by the fact that the Treaty now had more than 140 Parties and there were indications that the number would rise. The NPT continued to be a popular international document because the danger posed to international peace and security by the existence of nuclear weapons, and the proliferation of such weapons, had not diminished. That danger remained as long as nuclear weapons existed in the arsenals of some States and as long as a few other States gave hints that they sought to acquire or develop such destructive weapons. In the changing international political situation, the NPT had become more relevant than ever before. At a time when political and ideological divisions were dissolving, the potential for fulfilment of all the rights and obligations established by the Treaty had increased.

It was a fact that the Treaty had delineated two categories of States Parties: those States which possessed nuclear weapons and those which did not possess such weapons, with each category of States assuming different rights and obligations.

In his delegation's opinion, which was undoubtedly shared by many others, the NPT was a valid treaty because, in seeking to maintain international peace and stability, it had prevented the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States had observed the undertaking not to facilitate the emergence of other nuclear-weapon States. It was important to note that no other nuclear-weapon State had clearly come into existence since the NPT had entered into force. The nuclear-weapon States outside the NPT had, in declarations made in various international forums, committed themselves to the purposes and objectives of the NPT, and their actions, which were not legally constrained, had bolstered efforts to promote the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NPT had provided an opportunity for non-nuclear-weapon States to renounce legally their sovereign right to acquire nuclear weapons. Such renunciation by a majority of non-nuclear-weapon States was a direct contribution to the security and stability of the world and a strong rejection of weapons of mass destruction.

Again, the NPT was a valid treaty because, in seeking to prohibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it did not prohibit the peaceful uses of nuclear energy or international co-operation in such uses.

The Treaty sought to prohibit not only horizontal proliferation but also vertical proliferation. Article VI of the Treaty still remained to be totally fulfilled. Two of the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT continued to be engaged in bilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament negotiations that

had already culminated in the destruction of a whole category of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, those weapons continued to exist in the arsenals of a few States. The negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons should encompass all those States which possessed such weapons. The world could not be safe until all nuclear weapons, wherever they existed, were effectively and verifiably destroyed. The banning of all nuclear tests in all environments and for all time was long overdue. Under the present favourable international circumstances, there was no justification for the continuation of those tests.

The NPT had not limited the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties to establish nuclear-weapon-free-zones in their regions. The establishment of such zones had strengthened efforts against proliferation. It would be an important step if all nuclear weapon States were legally to recognize those zones in international treaties and lend their support to all efforts aimed at creating them in various parts of the world. In Africa, the legal recognition of such a zone would be most welcome.

Since non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT had given up their sovereign right to acquire nuclear weapons, it was essential to give them credible guarantees, in a legally binding international instrument, that they would not be attacked or threatened with nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States. However, the most effective guarantee for the security of all non-nuclear-weapon States would be total elimination and destruction of all nuclear weapons.

At the Second and Third Review Conferences criticisms had been levelled against the NPT and would no doubt be levelled again on the present occasion and prior to the 1995 Conference to decide whether the Treaty was to continue in force indefinitely or to be extended for an additional fixed period. The inequalities inherent in the NPT with regard to the rights and obligations of the States Parties had largely contributed to some States choosing to remain outside the Treaty. Any process that could lead to such States joining the NPT would be commendable. In the perspective of 1995, his Government was in favour of extending the NPT until its main objective, namely the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons both vertically and horizontally, was completely fulfilled.

Political problems required political solutions and not military solutions. The faulty logic of regarding nuclear weapons as instruments to achieve political aims would only encourage other States to acquire nuclear

weapons. Nuclear weapons did not offer security; they offered total destruction. Total elimination of those weapons would discourage others from desiring to acquire them.

The PRESIDENT said that, pursuant to rule 19 of the rules of procedure, he would give the floor to the representative of Iraq to exercise the right of reply.

Mr. AL-KOTAL (Iraq), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the representative of Italy had referred in his statement to the legality of recent events in the Middle East and to what that representative had called certain "humanitarian" aspects. Actually, it was perfectly clear that those events fell within the competence of other international bodies and any mention of them was out of place at the present Review Conference on the operation of the NPT.

There was one point, however, arising out of the Italian representative's remarks which was indeed relevant to the present proceedings and it was one to which that representative had deliberately omitted any reference. It was the negative repercussion on the purposes of the NPT of the presence in the Gulf of warships with nuclear weapons on board. That situation seriously affected the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States of the region. An illegal blockade had been imposed on Iraq with the aim of starving its 18 million inhabitants, thereby turning the Iraqi people into hostages.

The selective approach of the Italian delegation was clear. He wished to know what Italy had done when Israel had invaded Lebanon, part of whose territory Israel still occupied. He also wished to know what Italy had done over the period of more than 20 years in which Israel had been in occupation of Arab territories in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. Facts such as the annexation of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights by Israel were being ignored. Resort was being had to military measures in which Italy was participating; measures that would make it impossible for a peaceful solution to be reached to the Arab problem. Such a solution was the sole responsibility of the Arabs themselves and could not be the subject of bargaining or of foreign interference. Lastly, it was his hope that the Italian statement would not have any adverse repercussions on the Conference and on the NPT itself.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.